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1 Introduction
Hiring credits have been used in the United States and in a number of European countries
to counteract the employment e¤ects of the 2008-2009 recession.1 Despite this wide use,
many economists think that hiring credits are probably useless during recessions, when
aggregate demand is insu¢ cient relative to labor and other resources available in the
economy.2 In fact, there is very little empirical evidence about the e¤ects of hiring credits.
Evidence on federal programs in the US dates back to the 80s (Perlo¤ and Wachter,
1979, Bishop 1981), and the only recent evidence concerns hiring credits implemented
at the U.S. states level (Neumark and Grijalva, 2015). We seize the opportunity of the
natural experiment induced by the 2009 French hiring credit to highlight the e¤ectiveness
of such policies. Reduced-form estimates of the e¤ects of the French program relying on
comprehensive administrative data show that the hiring credit has had a signicant impact
on employment. Then, we use quasi-experimental variations induced by the program to
estimate key structural parameters of a search and matching model. Simulations of this
model show that the cost per job created is very sensitive to the type of hiring credit 
temporary vs. permanent, countercyclical vs time-invariant,3 generalized to all hires vs.
targeted at a small subset of hires , and to the economic environment rigid vs. exible
wages.
The French hiring credit, announced on 4 December 2008, relieved rms from social
contributions on new hires until 31 December 2009. The program was arbitrarily re-
stricted, for budgetary reasons, to rms with fewer than 10 employees, and to low-wage
workers. We show that these restrictions and other features of the program ensure that
its implementation can be considered as a natural experiment. Moreover, only a small
fraction of hires were actually eligible for the hiring credits so that the program did not
trigger spillover e¤ects.
1See OECD (2010) for a detailed presentation of hiring credit measures in 2009.
2For instance, Becker (2010), Posner (2010) and Gali (2013).
3By denition hiring credits provide subsidies to new jobs for a limited period of time at the beginning
of the job spell. Temporary hiring credits are one-o¤ schemes that provide these subsidies during specic
periods, whereas permanent hiring credits provide them permanently. Permanent hiring credits can be
either time-invariant or countercyclical, i.e. provided in slowdowns only. Neumark and Grijalva (2015)
report that 99 of the 147 hiring credits recorded in the United States over the period 1970-2012 are
permanent.
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Our evaluation of the French hiring credit relies on two identication strategies. The
di¤erence-in-di¤erences strategy compares the evolution of small rms (between 6 and 10
employees) and medium-size rms (between 10 and 14 employees) from November 2008,
just before the programs inception, until November 2009.4 The IV strategy compares
employment pool  sector cells with high and low shares of subsidized hires. We use the
share of low-wage workers from 2006 to 2008 as an instrument for the share of subsidized
hires. Both strategies yield converging results. The French hiring credit signicantly
increased by 0.8 percentage point the growth rate of targeted rms. Moreover, the em-
ployment e¤ects are concentrated as expected on eligible jobs, i.e. low-wage jobs. The
impact of the hiring credit emerged quickly: hires and employment began to rise three
months after the introduction of the credit. The evolution of hours worked is similar to
that of employment, meaning that rms did not substitute hours of new workers bene-
ting from the hiring credit for those of incumbent employees. We nd no increase in
wages associated with the hiring credit, and rms did not increase layo¤s in order to
hire workers at lower cost. Year placebo tests, and robustness analysis varying the rms
size bandwidth selecting the estimation sample, conrm our results. Comparing ineligi-
ble medium-sized rms in labor markets with a high or low fraction of subsidized hires,
we show that the hiring credit did not trigger equilibrium e¤ects, either through wage
adjustments or e¤ects on labor market tightness.
Building on these reduced-form analyses, we use quasi-experimental variations in labor
cost induced by the program to estimate a structural search and matching model. We
show that the variations in the coverage of the hiring credit and in the tightness across
local labor markets allow us to identify two key parameters: the elasticity of the marginal
revenue (with respect to labor) and the vacancy posting cost. The time-variation in
tightness and job nding rates within local labor markets before the 2009 French hiring
credit allow us to identify a third key parameter, i.e. the elasticity of the matching function
with respect to the number of job-seekers, as in Borowczyk-Martins et al. (2013).
Introducing directed search with wage posting into the model, in line with Moen (1997)
we show, in the spirit of the su¢ cient statistic approach (Chetty, 2009), that the three
structural parameters estimated above are su¢ cient to dene the cost per job created by
4Consistent with the program, we split rms according to their size computed from November 2007
to November 2008, before the program was announced.
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hiring credits in di¤erent cases: exogenous vs. endogenous wage, temporary vs. perma-
nent hiring credit (either countercyclical or time-invariant),5 hiring credit generalized to
all rms vs. hiring credit targeted at a small subset of rms (su¢ ciently small to have
no impact on the labor market tightness). Using our previous estimates of the structural
parameters, we compute the cost per job created by these counterfactual policies. In the
baseline scenario, which corresponds to the 2009 French hiring credit, the gross cost per
job created is around one fourth of the average annual wage. To compute the cost per job
created net of savings on social benets, we exploit a survey that provides information
about the characteristics of the beneciaries of the hiring credit. It turns out that the
2009 hiring credit has been very e¤ective, since the net cost per job created is about zero.
Nevertheless, our simulations suggest that the e¤ectiveness of hiring credits is contin-
gent on particular circumstances. In line with Kitao et al. (2010) and Kaas and Kircher
(2015), we nd that the (one-o¤, non-expected) temporary nature of hiring credits plays
a key role: permanent hiring credits, even targeted at a small subset of rms, create jobs
at a cost multiplied by a factor of four compared with one-o¤ non-anticipated temporary
credits available for new hires during one year.6 Hiring credits generalized to all rms
would have featured only a slightly higher gross cost per job created than a similar hiring
credit targeted at a small subset of rms, as long as wages are exogenous. This result, ob-
tained in a context of high unemployment rates, means that congestion e¤ects induced by
the hiring credit are too small to induce signicant increases in recruitment costs. When
wages are exible, the cost per job created by temporary hiring credits generalized to all
rms is only slightly higher than the cost per job created by temporary hiring credits
targeted at a small subset of rms, because one-o¤ temporary increases in labor market
tightness induced by temporary hiring credits have little impact on the expected gains of
unemployed workers, and therefore on wages. However, permanent economy-wide hiring
credits induce permanent increases in labor market tightness, and thus have a stronger
impact on the expected gains of unemployed workers and then on wages. We nd that
5In this paper, the cost per job created by a temporary hiring credit, set out for one year, corresponds
to the monthly cost necessary to create one supplementary job at the one-year time horizon, whereas the
cost per job created by a permanent hiring credit, set out without any foreseen time limit, is the monthly
cost necessary to create one supplementary job permanently, i.e. on an innite time horizon.
6Note that permanent hiring credits are di¤erent from wage subsidies, as, for a given worker, the
credit vanishes after a certain tenure in the rm - one year in our simulations.
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the reaction of wages multiplies by about 2 the cost per job created by generalized and
permanent hiring credits. This casts doubt about the e¤ectiveness of permanent hiring
credits, which are frequent (Neumark and Grijalva 2015, OECD, 2010).
Our paper contributes to the empirical debate on the e¤ectiveness of hiring credits.
It is related to Neumark and Grijalva (2015) who analyze state hiring credits in the
US.7 Using a di¤erence-in-di¤erences strategy across US states, they point to moderate
positive employment e¤ects of credits targeting the unemployed during recessions. To
our knowledge, our paper is the rst empirical evaluation of a temporary hiring credit
relying on comprehensive rm-level administrative data. The richness of the data and
the quasi-experimental situation induced by the French hiring credit allow us to evaluate
the impact of the hiring credit, with proper identication strategies, on a wide range of
outcomes not available in previous studies. Moreover, our paper is also the rst empirical
evaluation of a temporary hiring credit in Europe. European empirical evidence mostly
concerns the e¤ects of permanent payroll tax reductions. As both hires and incumbents are
eligible for these payroll tax reductions, they may imply large deadweight losses, and their
estimated e¤ects only partially inform us about the e¤ects of hiring credits.8 In Europe,
hiring subsidies may also be part of broader strategies to activate the unemployed. They
are frequently coupled with job search assistance programs, which makes it di¢ cult to
distinguish their impact, as in Blundell et al. (2004).9
We also contribute to the literature which builds bridges between quasi-experimental
or experimental data and structural estimation, i.e. Attanasio et al. (2012), Ferrall (2012),
Gautier et al. (2012), Galiani et al. (2015), Lise et al. (2015), Todd and Wolpin (2006)
and Wise (1985). Our approach features both internal validity and external validity. The
source of the identication of the key structural parameters is quasi-experimental and
7Our work is also related to the evaluations of the New Job Tax Credit (NJTC) implemented in the
US during the 70s by Perlof and Wachter (1979) and Bishop (1981). Both studies nd positive e¤ects of
the program, but their analyses su¤er from the economy-wide implementation of the NJTC, which makes
it di¢ cult to dene a proper counterfactual control group.
8Indeed, Goos and Konings (2007), Huttunen et al. (2013), Bennmarker et al. (2009), Egebark and
Kaunitz (2013) and Skedinger (2014) nd rather small employment e¤ects of permanent payroll tax
reduction.
9A notable attempt to distinguish the relative e¤ectiveness of the di¤erent components of activation
strategies is Sianesi (2008). For Sweden in the 1990s, she nds that entering a temporary job subsidy
program rather than searching further in open unemployment increased employment rates soon after the
program ended.
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makes use of a well-dened policy shock. Thus we gain internal validity. Then simulations
of the underlying economic model enable us to discuss the external validity of our reduced-
form results. This framework is useful to quantify congestion externalities in search and
matching models (Beaudry et al., 2012, 2014; Crépon et al., 2013; Gautier et al., 2012;
Lalive et al., 2013). It is closely related to Beaudry et al (2014) who show that the wage
elasticity of employment is larger in absolute value at the industry-city level than at the
city-level. They argue that the e¤ects of wage shocks at the city-level are damped by
congestion externalities induced by the reaction of the city-level labor market tightness.
We also nd that congestion externalities play a very important role through wages.
Congestion externalities exert an upward pressure on wages that signicantly reduces the
employment e¤ects of economy-wide hiring credits compared with hiring credits targeted
at a small subset of rms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the hiring credit scheme (zéro
charges) implemented in France in 2009. Section 3 presents the data, descriptive statistics
and the empirical strategy of the reduced-form approaches. The di¤erence-in-di¤erences
estimates are presented in Section 4. The results of the IV estimation are presented in
Section 5. Section 6 shows that the French program did not trigger equilibrium e¤ects.
Section 7 proceeds to the structural estimation of the search and matching model and
evaluates the cost per job created by hiring credits in di¤erent environments. The last
section concludes.
2 Institutional background
The zéro charges (zero contributions) measure was announced by the French President
on 4 December 2008. According to the original announcement, any hire (or temporary
contract renewal) of a low-wage worker in a rm with fewer than 10 employees occurring
from the date of the announcement until 31 December 2009 could benet during the
same year from an employer social contribution relief.10 The relief is maximal for workers
with an hourly remuneration at the minimum wage level (8.82 euros in 2009). With zéro
charges, employers do not pay any social contribution at the minimum wage level. The
10The new relief is in addition to the existing general social contribution reduction on low wages called
the Fillon reduction, which has prevailed since the 1990s and concerns all rms in the private sector.
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Figure 1: The hiring credit schedule.
Note: The horizontal axis reports the monthly wage (in euros) net of employer social contributions of
a full time worker ( in 2009, the monthly minimum wage was 1,338 euros in gross terms, i.e. including
employeessocial contributions). The vertical axis reports the monthly labor cost. The continuous line
displays the labor cost without the hiring credit. The dotted line shows the labor cost with the hiring
credit.
relief then decreases as the hourly wage level rises up to 1.6 times the minimum wage.
Figure 1 shows that the hiring credit reduces the labor cost by 12% for a full-time worker
paid at the minimum wage. The maximum amount of the hiring credit over 12 months
represents 2,400 euros. When the wage is 30 percent above the minimum wage, the
subsidy rate represents only 4 percent of the labor cost.
Before the rst announcement, the policy was not anticipated because it was kept
secret as part of a stimulus package to be disclosed all at once.11 This is illustrated by
Figure 2 which shows that Google searches for the item hiring subsidy(aide embauche)
started to increase in December 2008, once the announcement for the program was made.
There is no Google search for the item zéro charges before early 2009.
11For instance the newspaper Les Echos, describes in an article entitled Le gouvernement envisage
daccélérer ses paiements et remboursements aux entreprises, published on 27 November 2008, all po-
tential measures that the President Sarkozy was supposed to announce the following week at the Press
conference of 4 December 2008. The hiring credit is not mentioned in this article. On 4 December
2008, the article entitled Sarkozy dévoile un plan de 26 milliards deuros pour relancer léconomie,
summarizing the contents of the press conference, does mention the hiring credit.
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Figure 2: Results of Google search for the policy name.
Note: The vertical axis reports the monthly number of searches for one term relative to the highest point
on the gure; "aide embauche" means hiring subsidy. Variations in spellings (e.g. zéro charges, zero
charge) yield similar patterns to zero charges. The vertical line indicates the date at which the hiring
credit was introduced. Source: Google Trends website.
The practical details of the hiring credit were rapidly set out in a decree published on
20 December 2008. To start with, only rms and associations belonging to the private
sector could get the hiring credit. Firms and associations had to request the zéro charges
relief for each hire separately, lling out a one-page form and attaching the labor contract.
The claim had to be sent to the French Public Employment Service (Pôle emploi) which
reimbursed for the social contributions payments on eligible hires at the end of each
quarter.
Second, to be sponsored, hires had to be on contracts lasting at least one month, and
not otherwise sponsored by other targeted special measures, such as even more generous
and pre-existing subsidies for some disadvantaged groups (e.g. the long-term unemployed)
or apprentices; household jobs were also excluded on the ground of their specic and pre-
existing subsidies. The hiring credit was not restricted to rms with net employment
growth, and it was not limited to the hiring of the long-term unemployed or any other
disadvantaged groups.
Third, only entities with fewer than 10 full-time equivalent employees12 on average
12The size criteria are very precise and follow the usual rules set in the labor code (see cerfa n 13838-
01). Only ordinary employees are kept in the computation of the size (thus excluding apprentices and
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between January and November 2008 could apply. Hence, the period used to dene the
size criteria ends just before the announcement of the policy, on 4 December 2008. A
growing rm reaching 10 or more employees over the year 2009 could still continue to
receive subsidies and apply for new hires until the end of 2009. This meant that the size
criteria could not be manipulated by rms wishing to benet from the hiring credit.
Fourth, applying rms must not have red any workers for economic reasons on the
same job over the 6 months preceding the hiring date, nor must they have previously red
this particular worker over the same period from any other job, and they must have paid
all their social contributions in the past.
On 16 November 2009, the policy was extended to hires occurring up to 30 June 2010.13
On this occasion, the duration of the hiring credit was extended for up to 12 months from
the hiring date, instead of the cuto¤ date of 31 December 2009 for the initial scheme.
This new rule was also applicable to hires made in 2009 before the announcement of the
extension, and which already beneted from zéro charges. Firms below the average of 10
full-time equivalent employees from January 2009 to December 2009 were also eligible for
the extended program for their new hires in 2010. Hence it is more challenging to study
the e¤ects of the policy in 2010, as some rms treated in 2009 may not have been able to
apply in 2010, because eligibility for the extended period was then based on the average
size over 2009. As a consequence, we focus on outcomes in 2009.
The hiring credit was initially part of a wider array of policies - the stimulus package
- designed to cope with the 2008-2009 crisis. Within that array, this is the only item
specically targeted at small rms, and the only item directly altering the labor cost. The
exact size threshold of 10 employees was mostly determined by the government budget
constraints. Broadly speaking, there were no other explicit legal changes in this period
temporary agency employees and those hired as part of a labor market program). The size is computed
as the average of the end-of-month number of employees from January to November 2008. Fixed-term
workers contribute pro rata temporis their number of days present in the rm over the month. This
means that xed-term workers hired on the 15th of the month working full-time represent 0.5 employees.
However, workers hired on permanent contracts are counted as 1 employee during the month no matter
what day of the month they were hired on. All wage-earners working part-time, either on xed-term or
permanent contracts, are accounted pro rata temporis their regular number of hours during the month,
excluding overtime hours. For instance, wage-earners working mornings only are counted as 0.5 employee.
13The rst announcement about a possible extension was made in the end of September 2009. This
fact and the corresponding google search data shown on Figure 2 , suggest that rms did not expect that
the credit would be extended before the last quarter of 2009.
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that exerted a varying impact on rms with less or more than 10 employees.
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Figure 3: Firm size density. Source DADS.
While there are some minor discontinuities at the 10-employee threshold in the French
legislation,14 we do not see any accumulation of rms just below the threshold (see Figure
3). This suggests that the changes in the labor cost or in the labor regulations at the
threshold are not signicant, nor salient enough to lead rms to sort. Such a sorting
might have meant that rms below and above the threshold were reacting di¤erently to
the business cycles. This is in line with Ceci-Renaud and Chevalier (2010) who do not
nd any bunching at the 10-employee threshold. This contrasts with the accumulation
of rms just below the 50-employee threshold, as reported by Gourio and Roys (2014)
and Garicano et al. (2013). The di¤erence in patterns around the 10 and 50-employee
threshold is probably due to the greater change in costs at the 50-employee threshold and
its greater saliency.15 As Garicano et al. (2013, p. 14) put it, Although there are some
14An increase in the contribution rate for continuing vocational training of 0.55% to 1.05%, an obligation
of monthly payments of social security contributions (instead of quarterly payments), an obligation for
payment of transport subsidies and the loss of the possibility of a simplied balance sheet.
15There are more substantial discontinuities at the 50-employee threshold in the French legislation,
notably the possibility for employee unions of designating delegates, various obligations in the eld of
vocational training, the obligation to set up a works council, the obligation to set up a separate committee
on health, safety and working conditions, the obligation to set up a prots participation fundin favor of
employees, the obligation to set up social plans, i.e. time-consuming and costly procedure in the event
of redundancy involving 9 or more employees, and the loss of the possibility of a simplied presentation
of the nancial statements.
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regulations that bind when a rm (or less often, a plant) reaches a lower threshold such
as 10 or 20 employees, 50 is generally agreed by labour lawyers and business people to be
the critical threshold when costs rise signicantly.
3 Data and empirical strategy
3.1 Data
We use administrative data from two main distinct sources:
 the Déclarations Administratives de Données Sociales (DADS) built by the French
Statistical Institute (INSEE) from the social contributions declarations of rms.
Each year rms declare the employment spells, the number of hours worked, and
the associated wages for each worker.
 the administrative le produced by the French Public Employment Service (Pôle
emploi) which administered the payment of the subsidy, designated as the hiring
credit le. It contains information on the rms which enrolled in the zéro charges
program, the level of the hiring wage, and the exact amount and duration of the
subsidy received.
The DADS cover about 85% of French wage earners. Civil servants from the French
central, regional and local administrations (general government) and workers from the
public health care sector or employed by householders (e.g. for house-keeping or child
care) do not appear in this employment register (until 2009). We append the employment
registers from 2005 to 2009,16 creating a panel of rms.17 We restrict the sample to rms
in the for-prot private sector and we drop the agricultural sector as well as associations.
We also drop workers in temporary help agencies, as we do not know in which rms they
actually work, as well as the 1% of rms with the highest employment growth rates in the
sample. All relevant information pertaining to rm size, the number of hires, separations,
16The specication concerning the type of labor contract, either xed-term or open-ended, is not
available before 2005. Since the type of contract is used to compute the number of full time equivalent
workers, as explained in footnote 12, we cannot use the DADS before 2005.
17There is no permanent identier for individual workers. Our data are not a panel of individual
workers.
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Figure 4: Fraction of rms and of hires that beneted from the hiring credit by rm size
in 2009.
Note : The take-up rate is the share of rms below 10employees beneting from the hiring credit in 2009;
the attention rate is the share of hires with wages below 1.6 times the minimum wage lasting one month
or more and which were subsidized in 2009. The number of full-time equivalent employees is measured
over the rst 11 months of 2008.
the wage levels and the duration of contracts is taken from the DADS data set which
describes the universe of rms relevant to our evaluation. We also compute the eligibility
condition based on the size threshold (full-time equivalent) from the employment register,
as the Public Employment Service computed it for the subsidized rms only.
Our two data sets can be matched using the rm identier. This enables us to compute
the take-up rate, which corresponds to the fraction of small rms actually beneting from
the hiring credit in 2009. The take-up rate amounts to 24%. This gure depends on
the hiring rates of low-wage workers and on the take-up behavior conditional on hiring
low-wage workers, which we dene as the attention rate. The attention rate (the share of
subsidized hires among eligible hires with wages below 1.6 times the minimum wage and
contract duration above one month) amounts to 47%. Figure 4 displays the take-up rate
and the attention rate by rm size in 2008 (i.e. according to the eligibility criteria). The
take-up rate sharply decreases for rms with 8 employees or more and goes to zero for
rms larger than 12 employees. Similarly the attention rate drops before the threshold
and it is positive, around 3%, for rms with a workforce of 10 to 12 employees.
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To the extent that, as discussed above, rms were not able to manipulate their size
to meet the eligibility criterion, the drop in the attention rate before the threshold of 10
employees and the positive fraction of rms from 10 to 12 employees beneting from the
hiring credit are likely the consequences of measurement error. The eligibility criterion
is di¢ cult to measure precisely in the employment register at our disposal. In particular,
according to the legal rules, workers hired on permanent contracts are considered to be
present in the rm from the beginning of the month, even if they have been hired during
the month. Since we only observe the type of contract at the end of the year for every
worker, we are unable to know whether workers have been hired on permanent or tem-
porary contracts because temporary contracts may have been converted into permanent
contracts. Another reason could be that computing the eligibility criterion is a complex
task, especially for small rms. Only ordinary employees are kept in the size computation,
excluding apprentices and diverse categories of employees beneting from other subsidies;
employees contribute pro rata temporis but overtime hours are not taken into account.
These features of the eligibility criteria may induce rms to overestimate their size and to
refrain from claiming zéro charges. The resulting absence of discontinuity in the take-up
rate prevents us from using a regression discontinuity design.
3.2 Empirical strategy of the reduced-form approach
The hiring credit may inuence employment through its impact on hires and on separa-
tions. To see this, let us consider the law of motion of employment which determines the
level of employment at the end of the current period
L = L 1 +H   S; (1)
where L 1 stands for employment inherited from the previous period, H denotes the
number of entries and S is the number of separations.
Hiring credits aim at increasing employment through their e¤ect on hires. However, it
is possible that rms benet from important amounts of hiring credits while the e¤ects on
net employment are negligible. Becker (2010) and Posner (2010), reacting to the Hiring
Incentives to Restore Employment (HIRE) Act passed in the US in 2010, argued that it
will increase churning and wages with very little e¤ect on employment. In our context,
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churning is potentially an important concern to the extent that worker ows in excess
of those strictly necessary to achieve a given change in employment are large in France
(Abowd et al., 1999, Cahuc et al., 2014).
If the hiring credit increases employment, it is nevertheless possible that its impact on
hours worked is limited, because rms have incentives to substitute hours of subsidized
employees for those of non subsidized employees. Therefore, it is also important to analyze
the response of hours of work.
In what follows, we estimate the impact of the hiring credit on employment, wages,
hours of work, hires and separations, using two di¤erent identication strategies: a
di¤erence-in-di¤erences strategy and an IV strategy. The di¤erence-in-di¤erences strat-
egy contrasts the evolution of employment in rms with fewer than 10 employees and
rms with more than 10 employees before and after the reform was implemented. The IV
strategy contrasts the evolution of employment in employment pool  sector cells with
high or low treatment intensity after the reform was implemented. We instrument the
treatment intensity by the share of low-wage workers in the cell from 2006 to 2008 (before
the reform).
4 Di¤erence-in-di¤erences
This section presents the di¤erence-in-di¤erences econometric model and our main re-
sults on the e¤ects of the hiring credit on employment, hours worked, wages, hires and
separations.
4.1 Econometric model
We analyze yearly cohorts of rms. We select, for each cohort t, rms whose size criterion
in year t  1 is around the cut-o¤ (that is 10 full-time equivalent employees, calculated as
the average of end-of-month pro-rata temporis headcounts between January and November
of year t  1) and estimate the following di¤erence-in-di¤erences model:
Yit = + Zit + Dt + ZitDt +Xitb+ uit (2)
where Yit is the outcome of rm i in period t, Zit an eligibility dummy equal to 1 if the
rm size in period t   1 is below 10, Dt a dummy for year 2009 when subsidies can be
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claimed, Xit a vector of covariates listed in the next section and in the note of table
2.  is our parameter of interest. It captures the di¤erential evolution of the group
targeted by the hiring credit. It can be interpreted as an Intention-To-Treat parameter.
Accordingly, we refer, in this section, to rms with fewer than 10 employees in year t  1
as our treatmentgroup, even if they do not claim the hiring credit. Note that because
we dene our eligibility dummy for every year, the treatment e¤ect estimate is robust
to potential mean-reversion bias that could occur if the denitions of the control and
treatment groups had been based on the size of rms in 2008 only.18
In the benchmark estimations, the bandwidth goes from 6 (included) to 14 (excluded)
full-time employees in the previous year.19 In Table 1, we report characteristics of our
2009 cohort. These characteristics are measured in 2008. In the rst three columns, we
compare small and medium size rms. Small (i.e. eligible) rms operate less frequently in
manufacturing industry and slightly more often in retail, transport and merchant services
than non-eligible medium size rms. They are slightly more frequently located in the
Parisian area, and less frequently in the North West and the North East parts of France.
Almost half of small rms have sales of less than 2 million euros, while four medium-
size rms out of ve exceed that mark. Small rms are also younger: 13 percent have
existed for less than 5 years vs. 10 percent for medium-size rms. The composition of
the workforce (in 2008) di¤ers between small and medium-sized rms. Small rms have
more white collar employees, while medium-sized rms have more blue collar workers.
Finally, the share of low-paid workers and that of part-time workers are both higher in
small rms. These variables (lagged) are included in the regressions to control for these
di¤erences.
18Lets consider the simple di¤erence-in-di¤erences model, without controls, using the 2008 and 2009
cohorts of rms and with employment growth as an outcome. Then the di¤erence between small and
medium rms of the 2008 cohort writes:  = E
h
L2008 L2007
L2007
jL2007 < 10
i
  E
h
L2008 L2007
L2007
jL2007 > 10
i
.
If there is some mean-reversion bias around 10 employees,  would be strictly positive. Mean-reversion
bias entails that the same di¤erence using the 2009 cohort would be strictly positive even in the absence
of treatment e¤ect. However taking the di¤erence-in-di¤erences nets out the mean-reversion bias. Had
we dened the treatment group according to the rm size in 2008, whatever the rm cohort, any mean-
reversion bias would have contaminated our di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimate. Year placebo estimates in
Appendix C.1 conrm that our denition of the treatment group is robust to mean-reversion bias.
19In Appendix C.3, we present a robustness analysis where we vary the bandwidth around the 10-
employee cuto¤.
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Table 1: The characteristics in 2008 of eligible/ineligible and subsidized/unsubsidized
rms
Eligible Ineligible Di¤ test Subsidized Not subsidized Di¤ test
Nb employees in 2008 6-10 10-14 p-value 6-10 6-10 p-value
Manufacturing :153 :193 :000 :137 :160 :000
Construction :186 :187 :474 :191 :182 :000
Retail and transport :307 :288 :000 :319 :302 :000
Hotels and restaurants :100 :091 :000 :143 :083 :000
Merchant services :254 :244 :000 :208 :272 :000
Parisian area :241 :229 :000 :154 :275 :000
North-West :245 :254 :000 :265 :237 :000
North-East :120 :124 :032 :128 :116 :000
South-East :268 :264 :185 :307 :253 :000
South-West :127 :129 :382 :146 :119 :000
Sales below 2 millions euros :449 :204 :000 :519 :422 :000
Young rm (age below 5 years) :134 :102 :000 :145 :129 :000
Mean share of...
... male managers :207 :216 :000 :161 :225 :000
... female managers :121 :115 :000 :105 :127 :000
... male white-collar :079 :076 :004 :093 :074 :000
... female white-collar :210 :187 :000 :253 :194 :000
... male blue-collar :347 :364 :000 :352 :344 :006
... female blue-collar :036 :041 :000 :035 :036 :655
Mean share of ...
...low-wage workers :622 :605 :000 :712 :586 :000
...part-time workers :256 :208 :000 :258 :255 :039
Nb. of obs. 73; 042 31; 893 - 20; 451 52; 486 -
Source : DADS (Insee). Note : Low-wage workers earn between the minimum wage and 1.6 times this
amount (on an hourly basis). Part-time workers work below 80 percent of normal working hours. The
number of employees corresponds to the full-time equivalent in 2008 (average from 1 January to 30
November). The number of observations corresponds to the number of rms in the sample.
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4.2 Main results
The validity of di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimations is heavily dependent on the common
trend assumption. We describe the common trend for treated rms with previous size
between 6 and 10 (excluded) and control rms with previous size from 10 to 14 in Figure 5.
The outcome is average employment growth in each group.20 Employment is computed
at the rm level. Employment in year t is dened as employment on 30 November of
year t. This ensures that employment in 2008 is not inuenced by the hiring credit
that was announced on 4 December 2008. Let Li;t denote employment in rm i on 30
November of year t; average employment growth for each group is 1
Nt
P
i
Li;t Li;t 1
Li;t 1
where
Nt is the number of rms in the group. Figure 5 shows that the di¤erence in employment
growth rates between the treatment group and the control group is negative and constant
from 2006 to 2008. In 2009, this di¤erence becomes positive: the growth rate of the
treatment group drops by 0.9 percentage points while that of the control group drops by
1.6 percentage points.21 Figure 6 shows that the same phenomenon arises for hours of
work: the average growth rate of total hours of work per rm of the treatment group is
below that of the control group from 2006 to 2008 and becomes larger than that of the
control group in 2009. This points to positive treatment e¤ects, that we estimate below.
20We focus on the e¤ect of the hiring credit on the growth rate of employment rather than on the
employment level for the following reason. The common trend assumption on the employment level
requires identical di¤erences in employment levels between year t and year t  1 for the control and the
treatment group before 2009, i.e. LCt   LCt 1 = LTt   LTt 1 where Ljt stands for average employment of
group j (j = C for the control group and j = T for the treatment group) in year t < 2009: We checked
that this assumption is not fullled. This is not surprising inasmuch as the impact of productivity shocks
or labor costs shocks on the employment level are expected to increase with the size of the rm. This is
the case, for instance, when the wage elasticity of labor demand is constant. To see this, consider a simple
static model, where the production function is F (L) and the labor cost is equal to the net wage w times
the labor wedge : The optimal level of employment satises F 0(L) = w: This equation implies that a
one percent change in labor cost induces a change in employment level that is proportional to the initial
employment level of the rm, i.e. dL = L"d=; where " = F 0(L)=LF 00(L) denotes the elasticity of labor
demand with respect to the labor cost w. Note that taking log employment as outcome instead of the
employment growth rate is valid only if the distribution of past employment is stable over cohorts of the
control and the treatment groups. Running di¤-in-di¤ on growth rates allows us to get estimates that
are robust to potential changes in the distribution of past employment since the change in employment
of each rm is proportional to its past size.
21The average employment growth is negative for the treatment group and the control group all along
the period. This is because new entrants, which typically account for a signicant share of employment
growth, are excluded from the sample. Bear in mind that, by construction, we cannot include new
entrants since we study the behavior of rms that had between 6 and 14 full time equivalent employees
the previous year.
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Figure 5: Average employment growth rate in rms in the treated and control groups.
Note: Growth rate of employment between 30 November of year t   1 and year t. The treat-
ment group comprises rms of size between 6 (included) and 10 (excluded) full-time equivalent
employees in the previous year (average from 1 December to 30 November). The control group
comprises rms of size between 10 (included) and 14 (excluded) full time equivalent employees
in the previous year (average from 1 December to 30 November).
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Figure 6: Average hours growth rate in rms in the treated and control groups.
Note: Growth rate of the number of hours worked within each rm between November of year t
and November of year t  1. The treatment group comprises rms of size between 6 (included)
and 10 (excluded) full-time equivalent employees in the previous year (average from 1 December
to 30 November). The control group comprises rms of size between 10 (included) and 14
(excluded) full time equivalent employees in the previous year (average from 1 December to 30
November).
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In Table 2, we present our di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates for di¤erent outcomes
(in rows) and specications (in columns). In column 1, our baseline sample comprises
all cohorts from 2006 to 2009 without covariates. In column 2, we add covariates control
which include year, sector and regions dummies, as well as their interactions, dummies
for rm age, for rms with sales below 2 million euros in the previous year, the share of
low-wage and part-time workers in the previous year and the shares of female or male
workers with di¤erent occupations (managers, white-collar or blue-collar workers). In
column 3, we restrict the sample to cohorts 2008 and 2009 (to avoid potential specication
errors related to underlying trends). To deal with serial correlation problems which could
lead to misleadingly small standard errors (Bertrand et al, 2004), we follow the approach
suggested by Cameron and Miller (2015): in addition to the non-clustered robust standard
errors, we compute the cluster-robust standard errors at progressively broader levels,
starting at the rm level, then at the employment pool  sector unit level, and eventually
at the employment pool level.
The results are very stable. They indicate that the hiring credit increased the em-
ployment growth rate of the treatment group by about 0.8 percentage point (column 2
of Table 2). Table 2 shows that the impact of the hiring credit on the growth of hours
of work is similar to that on employment, indicating that rms did not reduce working
hours on existing jobs to compensate for new hires. The last row of Table 2 shows that
the hiring credit had no impact on the survival of rms, meaning that the hiring credit
raised employment in surviving rms. Indeed, estimates on the subsample of surviving
rms are identical to that of all rms, as shown in Table A11 in appendix.22
Table 3 displays separately the impact of the hiring credit on eligible jobs  jobs
paying below 1.6 times the minimum wage that last at least one month and on ineligible
jobs.23 The hiring credit has a strong positive and signicant impact on employment and
22Our estimates are not weighted by rm size. This could bias our results if, for instance, the elasticity
of labor demand depends on the size of rms. We checked that estimates provided in the course of the
paper yield results similar to weighted estimates. This is illustrated by Table A12 in appendix which
shows the weighted estimates corresponding to those displayed in Table 2.
23The number of observations in Table 3 is smaller than in Table 2 because it excludes rms with
eligible jobs only and rms with ineligible jobs only. The last column of Table 3 displays the di¤erence-
in-di¤erences estimates for all jobs with this smaller sample. Results are identical to those displayed in
Table 2, corresponding to the full sample also comprising rms without jobs either below or above 1.6
times the minimum wage.
20
Table 2: Di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates of the impact of the hiring credit on various
labor market outcomes in 2009
Cohorts 2006-2009 2006-2009 2008-2009
Covariates No Yes Yes
Emp. growth
:009
(:002; :002; :002; :002)
:008
(:002; :002; :002; :002)
:009
(:002; :002; :002; :002)
Hours growth
:010
(:002; :002; :002; :002)
:009
(:002; :002; :002; :002)
:008
(:002; :002; :002; :002)
Hiring rate
:014
(:005; :004; :004; :004)
:012
(:004; :004; :004; :004)
:019
(:005; :004; :004; :004)
Sep. rate
:005
(:005; :004; :004; :004)
:004
(:004; :004; :004; :004)
:010
(:005; :004; :004; :004)
Survival rate
:000
(:001; :001; :001; :001)
:000
(:001; :001; :001; :001)
 :001
(:001; :001; :001; :001)
Nb. Obs 406; 468 406; 468 207; 379
Source : DADS (Insee). Note : this Table presents our di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates for di¤erent
outcomes (rows) and di¤erent specications (columns). The treatment group comprises rms of size
between 6 (included) and 10 (excluded) full-time equivalent employees in the previous year (average
from 1 January to 30 November). The control group comprises rms of size between 10 (included) and
14 (excluded) full-time equivalent employees in the previous year (average from 1 January to 30
November). We consider as outcomes the growth rate of employment between 30 November of year t-1
and year t; the growth rate of the number of hours worked between November of year t-1 and November
of year t; the number of hires from 1 December of year t-1 to 30 November of year t divided by
employment on 30 November of year t-1; the number of separations from 1 December of year t-1 to 30
November of year t divided by employment on 30 November of year t-1; the survival rate from 30
November year t-1 to 30 November year t. We dene rms as survivors if they have at least one
employee paid at the end of November in year t. As covariates, we include year, sector and regions
dummies, as well as their interactions; we also include dummies for rm age, rms with sales below 2
million euros in the previous year, the share of low-wage and part-time workers in the previous year and
the shares of female or male workers with di¤erent occupations (managers, white-collar or blue-collar
workers). Standard deviations in parentheses, respectively, not clustered, clustered at the rm level, at
the employment pool X sector level, at the employment pool level. There are 348 employment pools
("zones demploi", Insee) and 5 sectors. * signicant at 10 percent, ** signicant at 5 percent, ***
signicant at 1 percent.
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Table 3: Di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates of the impact of the hiring credit for eligible
and ineligible jobs on various labor market outcomes in 2009
Eligible jobs Ineligible jobs All jobs
Employment growth :011
(:003)
 :002
(:004)
:008
(:002)

Hours growth :012
(:003)
 :005
(:004)
:008
(:002)

Hiring rate :011
(:004)
 :005
(:008)
:008
(:004)

Separation rate :000
(:004)
:003
(:008)
:000
(:004)
Nb. Observations 350; 633 350; 633 350; 633
Source : DADS (Insee). Note : this Table presents our di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates for di¤erent
outcomes (rows) and di¤erent types of jobs (columns): eligible jobs below 1.6 times the minimum wage
that last at least one month; ineligible jobs above 1.6 times the minimum wage or that last less than
one month; all jobs. The treatment group comprises rms of size between 6 (included) and 10
(excluded) full time equivalent employees in the previous year (average from 1 January to 30
November). The control group comprises rms of size between 10 (included) and 14 (excluded) full time
equivalent employees in the previous year (average from 1 January to 30 November). We consider as
outcomes the growth rate of employment between 30 November of year t-1 and year t; the growth rate
of the number of hours worked between November of year t-1 and November of year t; the number of
hires from 1 December of year t-1 to 30 November of year t divided by employment on 30 November of
year t-1; the number of separations from 1 December of year t-1 to 30 November of year t divided by
employment on 30 November of year t-1; As covariates, we include year, sector and regions dummies, as
well as their interactions; we also include dummies for rm age, rms with sales below 2 million euros in
the previous year, the share of low-wage and part-time workers in the previous year and the shares of
female or male workers with di¤erent occupations (managers, white-collar or blue-collar workers).
Robust standard deviations in parentheses. * signicant at 10 percent, ** signicant at 5 percent, ***
signicant at 1 percent.
hours for eligible jobs only. The impact for non eligible jobs is rather positive, but not
signicantly di¤erent from zero. This means that the hiring credit has had a positive
impact on total employment and total hours mainly through its impact on eligible jobs,
and very marginally on ineligible jobs.
4.3 Robustness checks
Our data set allows us to observe the evolution of employment month-by-month from 2006
to 2011. We use this information to exhibit the common trends of employment growth
between small and medium-sized rms at the monthly level, before the introduction of
the policy.
We compute the average employment growth from November of year t  1 to the end
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of month m in year t for both small and medium rms according to their size in year
t   1. We denote the average employment growths for small and medium-sized rms by
g1m;t and g
0
m;t respectively.
We then estimate, for every month from 2007 to 2009, the corresponding di¤erence-
in-di¤erences coe¢ cients: g1m;t   g0m;t   (g1m;t 1   g0m;t 1). Since there is no policy change
from January 2007 to November 2008 (last month before the announcement of the policy),
the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates provide placebo tests, as they should be 0 over this
period. Figure 7 shows that there is indeed no di¤erential employment evolution between
small and medium-sized rms. This gure is a further check of the common trend at
annual frequency shown in Figure 5. Appendix C provides year placebo tests on other
outcomes, as well as other robustness checks (placebo size cuto¤s, and changes in the
selection of the estimation sample).
Figure 7 also sheds light on the adjustment of employment in 2009. The estimated
impact of the hiring credit increases steadily over the year.24 It is clear that zéro charges
has had a signicant and quick impact on employment, since the di¤erence-in-di¤erences
estimates are positive, at 95% level of condence, from the end of February 2009 three
months after the start of the policy. This result is in line with the literature on dynamic
labor demand, according to which employment reacts quickly to shocks on labor costs,
with a delay that is clearly infra-annual (Hamermesh, 2013).
Figure 7 also reports di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates for 2010 and 2011. In order to
use only the pre-treatment period as reference to compute the di¤erential evolution of the
employment growth rate between small and medium sized rms over these two years, we
then dene the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimate for month m of year t as g1m;t   g0m;t   
g1m;2008   g0m;2008

: It is important to remark that these di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates
do not allow us to evaluate the impact of zero charges properly. As explained above, the
government announced on 16 November 2009 that the policy, which was initially designed
to stop on 31 December 2009, was extended to hires occurring up to 30 June 2010. Firms
below the average of 10 full-time equivalent employees from January 2009 to December
2009 were eligible for the extended program for their new hires in 2010. In this context,
the di¤erence-in-di¤erences method is not appropriate to properly identify the e¤ects
24It reaches 0.009 in November 2009, which is by construction consistent with Column 3 in Table 2.
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Figure 7: Di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates on the employment growth rate at the
monthly frequency.
Note: Each point plots the monthly di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimate of employment
growth rates between small and medium rms. The employment growth rate of month
m of year t is the average employment growth from November of year t   1 to the end
of month m in year t; for both small and medium-sized rms according to their size in
year t  1. The DiD estimates of each year t is computed using relevant reference years.
The reference year is 2006 for the 2007 DiD estimates, 2007 for the 2008 DiD estimates,
and 2008 for DiD estimates of years 2009, 2010 and 2011. The estimates are obtained
in a regression controlling for the same covariates as in column 3 of Table 2 and where
standard errors are robust. The 2009 DiD estimates capture the impact of the 2009 hir-
ing credits. The DiD estimates of years 2007 and 2008 are placebo tests of the common
trend assumption. The DiD estimates of years 2010 and 2011 are potentially biased by
endogenous selection into treatment groups for the 2010 extension of the hiring credit as
discussed in the main text.
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of the policy in 2010, as some rms treated in 2009 may not have been able to apply
in 2010, because eligibility for the extended period was then based on the average size
over 2009.25 Moreover, rms could have manipulated the eligibility criteria for the 2010
extension in December 2009: rms above the 10 employees threshold in November 2009
had an incentive to downsize. For this reason, the paper is focused on the impact of zéro
charges until November 2009.
That being said, Figure 7 shows that the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates are lower
in 2010 than in 2009, and only marginally signicant for the rst semester in 2010. Small
rms which already beneted from the hiring credit in 2009 did not experience any policy
change in December 2009, and thus did not grow beyond their already high employment
levels of 2009. This explains the sharp drop in the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates in
January 2010, which capture the e¤ect of the hiring credit on the employment growth from
November 2009 to January 2010. Then, during the second semester of 2010, di¤erence-
in-di¤erences estimates are not statistically signicant. They are marginally lower than
during the rst semester, capturing the reaction of rms to the disappearance of the
hiring credit. More interestingly, we do not nd any signicant intertemporal substitution
e¤ects, which would have implied signicantly slower growth of small rms after the credit
ends. However, insofar as the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates are probably biased after
2009, they are not relevant to properly identify intertemporal substitution e¤ects either.
Appendix Table A13 comprises another test which points to the absence of substitution
e¤ects: it shows that there is no evidence of di¤erent employment e¤ects of the hiring
subsidy between service sectors and other sectors in which production can be more easily
substituted from one period to another, thanks to storage.
4.4 Evaluation of the employment elasticity
Since the hiring credit decreased the total labor cost of rms in the treatment group by
0.2 percent26 and increased total employment by 0.8 percent, our estimates point to an
25Similarly, the policy extension announced in 2009 may have a¤ected the rm size distribution in 2010
and consequently the split between medium and small size groups in the computation of the di¤erence-
in-di¤erence estimates for 2011.
26In November 2009, rms in the treatment group got 3.6 million euros from zéro charges while their
labor cost during that month was 1.75 billion euros, which corresponds to a decrease of 0.21% in labor
cost. Over the course of year 2009, zéro charges decreased the labor cost of rms in the treatment group
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employment elasticity with respect to the change in labor cost induced by the hiring credit
of around  4; belonging to the 95% condence interval [ 6; 2].
The strong employment impact of zero charges relies on the absence of wage increases
and on the absence of increased churning of workers, as shown in appendices A and B. Even
if wages and labor turnover did not increase, this gure may at rst sight seem incredibly
high, compared to usual estimates of labor demand elasticities. For instance, Kramarz
and Philippon (2001) and Abowd et al. (2006) found that the elasticity of employment
with respect to the minimum wage is about  2 for men and  1:5 for women in France.
Crepon and Desplatz (2001), using a di¤erent empirical strategy, found an elasticity equal
to  0:8 for workers close to the minimum wage. The strong employment impact is not due
to an intertemporal substitution e¤ect, where rms would have frontloaded hires before
the end of the rst hiring credit period. We verify that the e¤ect is still as strong in
the service industries where production cannot be easily re-scheduled and bu¤ered using
inventories (see appendix Table A13).
The strong employment impact of zéro charges can be explained by the fact that a
temporary decrease in average labor cost can have stronger employment e¤ects when it
is induced by a hiring credit than by wage changes that apply to all employees. To show
this, let " stand for the elasticity of contemporaneous employment, L; when the change
in average labor cost per worker is due to a temporary change in the wage cost w of all
incumbent and entrant workers. This is the standard denition of labor demand elasticity
when the payroll equals wL: Let " stand for the elasticity of employment with respect to
the average labor cost per worker when the change in average labor cost per worker is due
to zéro charges. Bear in mind that the hiring credit alters the cost of entrants (i.e. new
hires) only. The relation between employment and hires is given by the law of motion of
employment (1). Let us assume that " is identical in all rms and that the hiring credit
does not increase churning of workers and wages, which is the case for zéro charges as
shown in appendices A and B. We get (see appendix F.1.1 for computation details):
" = " (3)
where  is the share of employees that benet from the hiring credit on 30 November
2009 in rms with positive take-up of zéro charges. As long as  < 1, the employment
by 0.14%. The amount of subsidies paid by zéro charges increased progressively during 2009.
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elasticity induced by the hiring credit is larger, in absolute value, than that induced by
a proportional change in the wage cost of all workers. The reason is that subsidizing the
jobs of incumbent workers yields no employment e¤ects in rms that do not layo¤workers
absent the subsidy: all it does is to create windfalls for these rms. Using hiring credits
is a means to target subsidies at marginal jobs, which yields positive employment e¤ects,
without providing subsidies to incumbent workers, which yields no employment e¤ects in
these rms.27 In the limit case where  = 1 (which would happen if the take-up rate were
100% and the whole workforce were renewed over the course of a year), the two elasticities
are identical because the entire workforce of rms that benet from the hiring credit is
subsidized.
All in all, we nd that "; the elasticity of employment with respect to labor cost induced
by a change in wage, is smaller, in absolute value, than when the labor cost is modied
by the hiring credit. The 95% interval condence of the elasticity " is [ 1:5;  0:5],28
which is in line with previous estimates obtained for France. We show in Appendix
C.3 that this estimate is likely a lower bound for the absolute value of the elasticity of
employment, which becomes larger when the di¤erence-in-di¤erences model is estimated
with bandwidths that exclude rms with positive take-up rates from the control group.
5 IV strategy: variations in treatment intensity across
labor markets
The validity of the di¤erence-in-di¤erences identication strategy relies on the assump-
tion that medium-sized rms - our control group - are not a¤ected by the policy. This
assumption is questionable. First, the supplementary hires induced by the hiring credit
might increase labor market tightness (vacancies/unemployment ratio) and thus the re-
cruiting costs for all rms. Second, the hiring credit may also increase wages in all rms.
In our context, it is unlikely that the control group has been a¤ected by the hiring credit
27It should be noticed that wage subsidies can lower job destruction (Schoefer, 2015). Since most job
separations a¤ect workers of low tenure, who potentially benet from the hiring credit, the di¤erential
impact of hiring credits and wage subsidies on job separations is an open question left for future research.
28 The share of employees that benet from the hiring credit on 30 November 2009 in rms with positive
take-up of zéro charges amounts to 0:26 which implies that " =  4  0:26 '  1 with a 95% condence
interval equal to [ 1:5; 0:5].
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to the extent that the hiring credit subsidized about 1% of all jobs only in the economy.29
Nevertheless, to deal with this issue, we implement an alternative identication strategy
which does not rely on the assumption that medium-sized rms have not been impacted
by the policy. We exploit variations in the treatment intensity across local sector-specic
labor markets.
5.1 Econometric model
We group rms into cells wherein the intensity of the treatment di¤ered. Cells are de-
ned as sectors in employment pools (or commuting zones). We distinguish 348 employ-
ment pools,30 and 5 sectors (manufacturing, construction, retail and transport, hotels
and restaurants, and other merchant services). We propose to use variation in treatment
intensity across cells to estimate the impact of the hiring credit on employment among el-
igible rms. Treatment intensity can be measured by the share of subsidized hires among
small rms in each cell. In cells where there is a larger share of subsidized hires among
small rms, zéro charges should entail a larger e¤ect on the growth rate of employment
among these rms.31 Formally, our equation of interest is:
Y 2009jk = + Ijk + Y
2008
jk + Xjk + vjk (4)
where Y 2009jk is the employment growth rate
32 between November 2008 and November 2009
averaged across eligible rms (with 6 to 10 employees in 2008) in commuting zone j and
producing in sector k, Y 2008jk is the lagged outcome, Ijk is the share of subsidized hires
among all hires in 2009 in small rms and captures the treatment intensity, Xjk is a set
of controls at the cell level.
29About 20 percent of workers are employed in rms with fewer than 10 employees. The take-up rate
of zéro charges amounts to 24 percent, and 26 percent of workers employed on 30 November 2009 in
rms with positive take-up benet from the hiring credit. Thus, the share of jobs that benet from zéro
charges in November 2009 was equal to 0:20 0:24 0:26 = 1:2 percent.
30We use the 348 zones demploi provided by INSEE, the French national statistical o¢ ce. A zone
demploi is a geographic area wherein most workers reside and work, and in which companies can nd
most of the labor needed for the jobs o¤ered. The denition of zone demploi is based on the ow of
commuting workers observed in the 2006 Census.
31This design was used to evaluate the e¤ect of the federal minimum wage in the United States using
cross-state variation in the fraction of low wage workers (Card, 1992).
32Henceforth, we focus on employment for the sake of clarity. Results on hours of work, which are not
statistically di¤erent from those obtained on employment, are consistent with those obtained with the
di¤erence-in-di¤erences strategy.
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The share of subsidized hires may be correlated with the error term vjk to the extent
that the take-up rate is endogenous. As an instrument for the treatment intensity, we
use the share of eligible hires (below 1.6 the minimum wage) in small rms averaged from
2006 to 2008. Note that this share is measured before the introduction of the program.
The share of eligible hires in 2009 would probably be more correlated with treatment
intensity but it is also endogenous, since rms can always shift their wage o¤ers to be
eligible for the hiring credit. Therefore it cannot be used as an instrument.
One concern with our instrument could be that it also a¤ects employment growth
directly. For example, this would be the case if the business cycle has di¤erential e¤ects
for low-wage or high-wage workers. To limit this concern, we include, as an independent
variable, a shift-share prediction of employment growth from 2008 to 2009 in the same
cell. In every cell jk, we measure the 2008 share of employment in the sub-industries
l of sector k; which we denote Sljk: Then, for every 2-digit industry l; we compute the
national employment growth from 2008 to 2009 in rms below 50 employees, excluding the
commuting zone j: gl j. The shift-share prediction writes: l2k S
l
jkg
l
 j:To further control
for local shocks, we introduce as independent variables the lagged employment growth
from 2007 to 2008 of small rms in the commuting zones around the cell of interest,
both producing in the same sector and in the other sectors. The set of controls Xjk also
includes sector dummies and some key cell characteristics measured in the previous year
as in the di¤erence-in-di¤erences strategy: the distribution of rmsage, the (log) cell
size, the share of rms with sales below 2 million euros, the share of part-time workers
and the share of female/male executive/white-collar/blue-collar workers. It also includes
cell-level measures of sales/value-added/dividends per employee and of nancial leverage
(i.e. debt over equity), averaged over the pre-policy period from 2005 to 2008.33 These
balance sheet data come from the French tax returns FICUS/FARE.
The IV strategy can only succeed if there is variation in the share of low-pay hires
across employment pool  sector cells. This is the case as shown in Figure 8, which
displays the distribution of this share among the 348 employment pool  5 sector cells in
our sample (i.e. around 1720 observations, in total, given that some pools do not feature
all sectors). The 2006-2008 average share of eligible hires among small rms (with 6 to 10
33The debt-over-equity ratio is a commonly-used measure of nancial leverage in the literature (see the
recent example in Giroud and Mueller, 2017).
29
Figure 8: Density of the share of eligible hires from 2006 to 2008 among small rms.
employees to be consistent with our baseline estimates) averages 0:575 with a standard
deviation of 0:093.
5.2 Results
We rst estimate equation (4) using weighted OLS, where weights are the employment
size of each cell as measured among 6-10 employees rms in 2008. Columns 1 and 2 of
Table 4 show that a higher share of subsidized hires is associated with a higher growth
rate of employment. However, the presence of confounding variables, inuencing the
employment growth rate and the share of subsidized hires, can imply that OLS estimates
are biased. For instance, commuting zones where entrepreneurs are more dynamic may
create more jobs and may have lower take-up rates of the hiring credit because their
opportunity cost of applying for the hiring credit is higher. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4
show the results of the IV estimation. The upper panel reports the estimates of the rst
stage. It shows that the share of eligible hires from 2006 to 2008 is a strong predictor of
the treatment intensity in 2009. The coe¢ cients of the second-stage estimation, reported
in the bottom panel, are larger than those obtained with OLS, and they are consistent
with the estimates obtained with the di¤erence-in-di¤erences strategy.34 We checked that
34To compare these estimates with the benchmark intention to treat estimates obtained in table 2, one
needs to account for the share of subsidized hires among small rms. In our sample, the weighted average
value of this share is 0:17. Using the value of the coe¢ cient of the fourth column of table 4 this leads
to e¤ects at the mean value of 0:17  0:138 = 0:023 on the employment growth rate with 95 percent
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restricting the sample to cells with at least 10, or 30 rms between 6 and 10 employees,
does not alter these results. Appendix C provides year placebo tests.
Table 4: Cross-unit estimates of the impact of the hiring credit on employment growth
rates in 2009, based on OLS and IV
OLS IV-2SLS
Covariates No Yes No Yes
First stage
Share of subsidized hires (Ijk)
Share of eligible hires in 2006-2008 :519
(:025)
 :267
(:036)

R2 :294 :392
Second stage
Employment growth
Share of subsidized hires (Ijk) :029
(:012)
:028
(:012)
 :067
(:020)
 :138
(:069)

R2 :006 :057
Nb. Observations 1; 721 1; 721 1; 721 1; 721
Source : DADS and FICUS/FARE (Insee), Pole emploi. Note : This table presents estimates based on
cross-cell di¤erences in the intensity of treatment in 2009. Each cell corresponds to one employment
pool and one sector. Within each cell the treatment group comprises rms of size between 6 (included)
and 10 (excluded) full-time equivalent employees in the previous year (average from 1 January to 30
November). Each cell is weighted by its relative employment size as measured among 6-10 employees
rms. We consider as outcome the growth rate of employment between 30 November of 2008 and 2009.
We control for the lagged employment growth rate from 2007 to 2008. The share of subsidized hires in
2009 is instrumented average share of eligible hires (i.e. hires in small rms with wages between the
minimum wage and 1.6 times the minimum wage) in the corresponding cell from 2006 to 2008.
Covariates include a a shift-share prediction of employment growth from 2008 to 2009 in the same cell,
and the lagged employment growth from 2007 to 2008 of small rms in the commuting zones around the
cell of interest. The set of controls also includes sector dummies and some key cell characteristics
measured in the previous year: the distribution of rmsage, the (log) cell size, the share of rms with
sales below 2 million euros, the share of part-time workers and the share of female/male
executive/white-collar/blue-collar workers. It also includes cell-level measures of
sales/value-added/dividends per employee and of nancial leverage (debt over equity), averaged over
the pre-policy period from 2005 to 2008. Robust standard deviations in parentheses. * signicant at 10
percent, ** signicant at 5 percent, *** signicant at 1 percent.
To check further that our two identication strategies yield consistent results, we
regress the di¤erence-in-di¤erences equation (2) on the sample made of the employment
pool  sector units. To do so, for each unit and each year we compute the average
growth rates of employment and hours worked separately for the two groups of rms
(treatment or control). We weight each employment pool  sector unit by its employment
interval condence [0:001; 0:046].
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size among rms from 6 to 14 full-time equivalent employees in the previous year. The
results, in appendix Table A14, are similar to those of Table 2. If we restrict our sample
to employment pool  sector units with at least 10, or 20 rms with 6 to 10 employees
present in a given year, results remain unchanged.
6 Equilibrium e¤ects
Our previous results suggest that medium-sized rms have not been a¤ected by the hiring
credit targeted at small-sized rms to the extent that we nd consistent results with the
di¤erence-in-di¤erences and the IV identication strategies. Nevertheless, to shed more
light on this issue, we check whether employment and wages of rms above 10 employees,
as well as the duration of vacancies have been impacted by the share of subsidized hires in
their employment pool  sector cell. If there are equilibrium e¤ects that reduce the net
impact of the hiring credit, we should observe lower growth rates of employment among
non-eligible rms in cells with a higher share of subsidized hires. Similarly, we should
observe either higher wage growth or longer vacancy duration in cells with a higher share
of subsidized hires. We adopt the same denition of cells as in the previous section (348
commuting zones  5 sectors).
Within each of the 1; 720 employment pool  sector units for which we have ob-
servations in both the treatment and the control groups for 2008 and 2009 (i.e. 1675
observations, in total), we compute the ratio of subsidized hires in 2009 to all hires ob-
served in the same year among rms with 0 to 20 full-time equivalent employees in 2008,
denoted Sjk, where j stands for the employment pool and k for the sector. The average
value of Sjk; is 0:182, and its standard deviation is 0:085: We also compute for each unit
the average growth rate of employment and of wages from November 2008 to November
2009 among rms having from 10 to 20 full-time equivalent employees in the previous
year.35 Using data on vacancies posted at the French Public Employment Service, we
compute the average time needed to ll vacancies posted in 2009 for each unit. We then
compare the labor market outcomes across units with di¤erent shares of subsidized hires.
35To control for di¤erential selection into employment across unit, we restrict the wage computation to
workers who were both employed in 2008 and in 2009 (see appendix A for more details on wages data).
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To achieve this, we estimate the following model :
Y 2009jk = + Sjk + Y
2008
jk + Xjk + ujk (5)
where Y 2009jk stands for our outcome of interest in 2009 in employment pool j and sector
k, Y 2008jk its value in the previous year, Sjk is the share of hires in the cell subsidized by
the 2009 hiring credit. The term ujk is a residual. We include the same set of control
variables Xjk as in the IV strategy of the previous section.
As in the previous section, the number of subsidized hires in 2009 might be a¤ected by
unobserved shocks that also a¤ect employment of medium-sized rms, meaning that the
ratio Sjk of subsidized hires in 2009 is potentially endogenous in equation (5). For this
reason, the ratio Sjk of subsidized hires in 2009 is instrumented by the corresponding aver-
age share of eligible hires from 2006 to 2008 (when the subsidy was not yet implemented),
denoted Ejk.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 present the results of the OLS estimation of equation (5),
one row for each outcome. Columns 3 and 4 present the results of the IV estimation.
Focusing on the results for employment growth and wage growth (rst two rows), there
is a statistically signicant positive correlation between the share of subsidized hires in
2009 and the growth rates of employment and wages in 2009, when we do not add any
controls (column 1). Without any controls, the IV estimates are also statistically signif-
icant (column 3). However, as we add controls, the OLS and IV estimates are smaller
and no longer statistically signicant - except at the 10% level for the OLS estimate on
wages. Concerning the vacancy duration, we do not nd any statistically signicant e¤ect
of the local share of subsidized hires, once we add controls and instrument the share of
subsidized hires. Table 6, which presents the rst stage of the IV estimation shows that
the shares of subsidized hires in 2009 are strongly correlated with the instruments. These
results remain unchanged if we restrict our sample to all employment pool  sector cells
with at least 10 or 30 rms. In appendix C.4, we show that we do not nd any equilibrium
e¤ects when we allow the spillovers to go beyond the boundaries of the commuting zone
 sector cell. All in all, these results suggest that the hiring credit had no impact on the
medium-sized rms.
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Table 5: Cross-unit estimates of equilibrium e¤ects on the employment and wage growth
rates of rms with 10-20 employees and on the vacancy duration, based on OLS and IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV 2SLS - Second stage
Employment growth :073
(:017)
:027
(:022)
:118
(:023)
:008
(:051)
Wage growth :110
(:021)
:023
(:012)
:185
(:026)
:055
(:035)
Vacancy duration (log)  :184
(:145)
:033
(:054)
 :529
(:157)
 :037
(:142)
Covariates No Yes No Yes
Nb. Observations 1; 675 1; 675 1; 675 1; 675
Source : DADS and FICUS/FARE (Insee), Pole emploi. Note: This table presents estimates based on
cross-cell di¤erence in treatment intensity in 2009. Each cell is one sector in one commuting zone. The
treatment intensity is measured as the ratio of subsidized hires in 2009 over total hires in the same year
among rms smaller than 20 employees. The dependent variable is either the employement growth of
rms sized 10-20 in the previous year (line 1), or the wage growth of their employees (line 2), or the
average vacancy duration in 2009 in the cell (line 3). In the IV regressions, the treatment intensity is
instrumented by the corresponding shares of eligible hires, i.e. the ratios of the eligible hires in 2008 to
total hires in the same year among rms with 0 to 20 full-time employees in the previous year, averaged
from 2006 to 2008. Covariates include a shift-share prediction of employment growth from 2008 to 2009
in the same cell, and the lagged outcome. The set of controls also includes sector dummies and some
key cell characteristics measured in 2008: the distribution of rmsage, the (log) cell size, the share of
rms with sales below 2 million euros, the share of part-time workers and the share of female/male
executive/white-collar/blue-collar workers. It also includes cell-level measures of
sales/value-added/dividends per employee and of nancial leverage (debt over equity), averaged over
the pre-policy period from 2005 to 2008. Weights are used: for each employment pool x sector unit the
weight equals total employment among rms with less than 14 full-time equivalent employees in the
previous year. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * signicant at 10 percent, ** signicant at 5
percent, *** signicant at 1 percent.
Table 6: First stage of the instrumental variable estimates of equilibrium e¤ects.
IV 2SLS - First stage
Share of subsidized hires (Sjk)
Share of eligible hires in 2006-2008 (Ejk) :597
(:028)
:439
(:042)
R2 :478 :593
Covariates No Yes
Nb. Observations 1; 675 1; 675
Source : DADS and FICUS/FARE (Insee), Pole emploi. Note: This table presents the rst stage of the
IV estimation of equation (5). We regress, at the cell level, the share of subsidized hires in 2009 on the
share of eligible hires in the same year - among rms smaller than 20 employees. We use the same
covariates and weights, as in table 5. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * signicant at 10 percent,
** signicant at 5 percent, *** signicant at 1 percent.
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7 Costs per job created
In this section, we rst compute the cost per job created by zéro charges under the
assumption that there are no equilibrium e¤ects. This assumption is consistent with the
results of section 6. Only a small share of rms were eligible for this temporary hiring
credit, in a context where the minimum wage was binding and unemployment was high,
so that we do not observe any equilibrium e¤ects. In the second part of this section, we
estimate the parameters of a structural search and matching model in order to simulate
how equilibrium e¤ects could a¤ect the cost per job created, if the hiring credit were
implemented in di¤erent economic environments, at di¤erent scales and on di¤erent time
spans. A potential concern with this approach is that the estimation of the structural
parameters of the search and matching model relies on the behavior of small-sized rms
following a shock on low wages. In this context, empirical evidence suggests that our
estimates would rather yield a lower bound of cost per job created.36.
7.1 Cost per job created by zéro charges
Based on our estimates, it is possible to compute the gross cost per job created by the
hiring credit in the treatment group. The cost per job created by the hiring credit, c, is
a simple function of the contemporaneous wage w and of the employment elasticity with
respect to the change in average labor cost induced by the hiring credit (see appendix
F.1.1):
c =  w
"
(6)
Since we estimated that " =  4; this formula also indicates that the cost per job created
is equal to 25% of the cost of a job. Accordingly, at the end of 2009, the monthly cost of
creating one job amounts to around 700 euros.37
36Empirical evidence shows that the labor demand for low-skilled workers is more elastic (Hamermesh
(2013), Lichter, Peichl, and Siegloch (2015)). Therefore, if the credit had concerned all types of workers,
we expect the cost per job created to be higher. Second, there is far less empirical evidence on the
heterogeneity of labor demand elasticity by rm size. That being said, we can expect large rms to
be more capital intensive. The standard labor demand theory of Cobb-Douglas rms predicts that the
short-run labor demand elasticity decreases with the capital intensity of the rm. Then the cost per
job created estimated on small rms is probably a lower bound of the cost of a similar hiring credits,
independent of rm size.
37Alternatively, we can directly compute the cost per job created from the treatment e¤ect estimate.
There are 646; 717 jobs in the treatment group at the end of 2008 (cf. appendix). According to table 2,
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This is a gross cost, because it ignores the savings generated by job creation in terms
of unemployment and other social benets that would have been paid in the absence of
the measure. It also ignores the remaining social contributions paid by employees on
these additional jobs. We exploit a survey, presented in appendix D, which allows us
to precisely evaluate the savings permitted by zéro charges on social benets. To this
end we rely on two key assumptions. First, consistent with our estimation of the impact
of zéro charges on net job creation, we assume that the number of jobs created by zéro
charges reduced non-employment by the same amount. Second, we assume that social
benets would have been paid to individuals identical to the beneciaries of zéro charges
if they had remained on the dole. We nd that the savings amount to about 700 euros
per month. This makes the net cost of the hiring credit per created job equal to zero.38
7.2 The search and matching model
The previous estimated costs hold for a small and temporary hiring credit program which
subsidized about 1% of all jobs in the economy and had no equilibrium e¤ects. Moreover,
this hiring credit was implemented during a recession, in a context where the minimum
wage was binding and unemployment was high. A hiring credit covering more hires or
occurring in di¤erent environments might entail equilibrium e¤ects which could change
signicantly the impact of the policy, as suggested by Beaudry et al. (2012, 2014), Crépon
et al. (2013), Gautier et al. (2012), and Lalive et al. (2013). To shed light on this issue,
we estimate a search and matching model which enables us to account for equilibrium
e¤ects.
7.2.1 Model description
We consider a discrete time economy with a large number of labor pools or islandsin
which a representative rm produces a di¤erentiated product with labor only as in the
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) model. The revenue function of the rm in period t is equal to
our estimate of coe¢ cient  when the dependent variable is L=L 1 in equation (2), equals 0:008. Thus,
the number of jobs created in the treatment group is 0:008  646; 717 = 5; 173: The zéro charges hiring
credit provided 3:6 million euros to the rms of the treatment group in our sample at the end of the
period, i.e. in November 2009. Accordingly, at the end of 2009, the monthly cost of creating one job
amounts to 700 euros.
38These costs do not account for the potential costs associated with distortive taxes used to nance
the hiring credit.
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AtR(Lt); where R is an increasing and concave function homogeneous of degree (1 + ) ;
such that R (Lt) = (Lt)
1+ =(1 + ); and At > 0 is a productivity parameter. In this
set-up, parameter  is a composite of the labor elasticity of the production function and
of the price elasticity of the demand function for the product of the rm, as shown in
appendix F.1.1.
The rm needs to post vacant jobs to hire workers. A vacant job costs cV units of
output per period. In each period, the sequence of decisions is as follows: 1) an exogenous
proportion qt 1 of workers quit the rm; 2) vacant jobs are posted; 3) workers are hired; 4)
production takes place and wages are paid. The assumption of exogenous job separation,
which allows us to simplify the analysis, is consistent with the nding that the hiring
credit did not induce rms to increase labor turnover in order to benet from the subsidy
(appendix B).
A vacant job posted in period t is matched with a worker with probability mt 2 [0; 1]
in the period and remains vacant with probability 1 mt. The probability to ll a vacant
job is determined by a matching function: m(t) = m
 
t ; where t = Vt=Ut 1; equal to
the ratio of the number of job vacancies Vt over the number of unemployed workers Ut 1,
denotes the labor market tightness; m is a positive parameter, and ; the elasticity of
matching with respect to unemployment, belongs to the interval (0; 1):
Exogenous wages
Let us denote by wt the wage in period t and by (Zt; Lt 1) the value function of
the rm, where Zt = (At; wt;mt; qt 1). Let  denote the discount factor and Et the
expectation operator. When wages are exogenous, the value function of the rm satises
(Zt; Lt 1) = max
Vt
AtR(Lt)  wtLt   cV Vt + Et(Zt+1; Lt)
subject to the law of motion of employment:
Lt = (1  qt 1)Lt 1 +mtVt
The solution of the rms problem is detailed in appendix F. When the wage is exoge-
nous (see appendix F.1), the equilibrium values of employment and of the labor market
tightness are dened by the labor demand equation derived from the solution of the
37
maximization problem of the rm, and by the law of motion of the unemployment rate
ut = 1  Lt:
AtRL(Lt) = wt +
cV
m(t)
  (1  qt)Et cV
m(t+1)
(7)
ut = ut 1 + qt 1(1  ut 1)  tm(t)ut 1: (8)
Endogenous wages
The case with endogenous wage is described by a directed search and matching model
with wage posting in the spirit of Moen (1997) and Kaas and Kircher (2015). In each
labor pool, employers post vacant jobs. Each job vacancy is posted with a non renegotiable
wage which applies throughout the employer-employee relationship. Unemployed workers
are assumed to have perfect information on the situation in each labor pool. Their search
activity can be directed toward their preferred employment pool. The mobility of workers
between labor pools is perfect. The solutions to the model and the computation of the
cost per job created are presented in appendix F.2.
The assumption of wage posting also implies that the market equilibrium allocation
is constrained e¢ cient if the product market is perfectly competitive. To give room to
welfare improving hiring subsidies, we assume that there is imperfect competition on the
product market. This ensures that the market equilibrium unemployment rate is higher
than the constrained e¢ cient unemployment rate.39
7.2.2 Structural estimation
Our objective is to estimate the parameters ; cV and  = LRLL(L)=RL(L), i.e. the
elasticity of the marginal revenue with respect to labor. It is shown, in appendix F, that
these parameters, together with the discount factor ; the job separation rate qt, the
duration of job vacancies, 1=m(t); and the unemployment rate ut, allow us to compute
the elasticity of employment with respect to di¤erent types of hiring credit: temporary,
permanent, targeted at a small subset of jobs, generalized to all jobs.
39An alternative possibility would have been to assume perfect competition on the product market
and wage bargaining. However, wage bargaining in large (i.e. with more than one employee) rms with
decreasing marginal productivity of labor induces over-employment, as shown by Stole and Zwiebel (1996)
and Cahuc et al. (2008). Accordingly, assuming wage bargaining in a context with large rms does not
produce ine¢ ciently high unemployment, leaving less scope for welfare improving hiring credits.
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Table 7: Estimates of the parameters of the matching function.
(1) (2)
Dep. var. Job nding rate (log)
OLS IV
Labor market tightness (log) :654
(:018)
:545
(:060)
Year FE Yes Yes
Employment pool FE Yes Yes
Nb. Observations 1; 392 1; 044
Source : Pôle emploi and Enquête emploi (Labor Force Survey, Insee) Note: Estimation of the
parameter of the job matching function equation (A15) on 348 employment pools from 2006 to 2009.
(1) Standard (within) OLS ; (2) IV regression. As an instrument we use the lagged value of the labor
market tightness. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * signicant at 10 percent, ** signicant at 5
percent, *** signicant at 1 percent.
Following the search and matching literature (e.g. Kaas and Kircher, 2015; Hall,
2017), the annual discount factor  is set at 0:95. The other statistics qt; 1=m(t); ut 
are directly observable in our data. We conduct the structural estimation of parameters
; cV and  in two steps  see appendix E for more details on the data and on the
estimation.
Matching technology
First, using data on job nding rates and tightness at the employment pool level
from the Public Employment Service and from the Labor Force Survey, we estimate the
parameters of the matching technology. The elasticity  is identied using variations of
job nding rates and labor market tightness over time within employment pools. In the
spirit of Borowczyk-Martins et al. (2013), we address potential endogeneity issues using
an IV strategy based on past values of the labor market tightness. The results of the
estimation are presented in Table 7. We obtain an elasticity of the matching function
with respect to the unemployment rate, , around 0:45.
Revenue function and vacancy posting cost
Second, we estimate the production parameters, namely the elasticity of the marginal
revenue with respect to labor, ; and the cost of posting a vacancy cV . These parameters
are obtained by conducting a structural estimation of the labor demand equation (7). The
identication strategy, which relies on the natural experiment triggered by zéro charges,
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is similar to the IV strategy developed in section 5. We focus on small rms, which are
eligible for the program. The policy shock entails exogenous variations in labor cost that
are used to identify the revenue parameter . In employment pools where the shock on
labor cost is larger because the share of hires eligible for the hiring credit is larger, average
employment e¤ects should also be larger. These di¤erences in employment e¤ects yield
the elasticity of the marginal revenue . The estimation strategy is complemented to as
well recover the vacancy posting cost cV . The e¤ects of the hiring credit on employment
are larger where baseline hiring costs are lower. Hiring costs depend on the time needed
to ll a vacancy. In a tight labor market, where vacancy duration is large, the hiring
credit is less e¤ective. Using heterogeneity in the e¤ects of the hiring credits across local
labor markets with low or large vacancy duration, we identify the vacancy posting cost cV .
Both parameters the elasticity and the vacancy cost are identied using the average
values over 2006-2008 in rms with 6 to 10 full-time employees of the share of eligible
hires, of the duration of job vacancies and of the job separation rate, as instruments for
the hiring credit and the hiring cost in 2009. Note that the structural estimation of the
labor demand is simplied by the fact that the identifying shock has no impact on wages
and labor market tightness, as shown in section 6.
The results of the regression of employment growth on labor cost and hiring costs are
presented in Table 8. We show in appendix E that the coe¢ cient of the average hiring
credit, denoted a1; in the regression of Table 8 is the inverse of the absolute value of the
marginal revenue elasticity : The IV estimate of a1 then entails that the elasticity of
the marginal revenue with respect to labor is about  0:96:We also show in the appendix
that the coe¢ cient of the hiring cost, denoted b1; is the ratio of the vacancy cost in terms
of wage cV =wt 1 over the elasticity : Consequently, Table 8 implies that the annual cost
of a vacant job represents 5:8% of the annual wage. Since the average duration of a job
vacancy is about 0:2 year, the hiring cost amounts to 1:2% of the annual wage, which is
in line with the available empirical evidence.40 Overall, these values imply that the micro
elasticity of employment to a change in labor cost, which is about  1, is consistent with
40Kramarz and Michau (2010) estimate that hiring costs represent 2.8% of the wage bill in France.
Flinn (2006) nds that the ow vacancy cost is 1.5% of the annual labor cost at the minimum wage in
the US. For an overview on several countries, see Manning (2011) Table 2, p 983.
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the di¤erence-in-di¤erences and the IV estimates presented above.41
Table 8: Estimates of the parameters of the revenue function and of the search cost.
(1) (2)
OLS IV
First stage
Dep. var. Average hiring credit Hiring cost
Share eligible hires :030
(:003)
 :003
(:012)
Duration of vacant jobs :020
(:011)
:851
(:081)
Separation rate :015
(:001)
:341
(:007)
Second stage
Dep. var. Employment growth
Average hiring credit (a1) :694
(:127)
1:04
(:282)
Hiring cost (b1)  :050
(:016)
 :061
(:018)
Controls Yes Yes
Nb. Observations 1; 588 1; 588
Source : Pôle emploi and DADS (Insee). Note: This table presents the estimation of equation (A19). In
the OLS and the second stage of the IV estimation, the dependent variable is the average growth rate of
employment from 1 December 2008 to 30 November 2009 in each employment pool x sector unit, among
rms with 6 to 10 full-time equivalent employees in the previous year. The independent variables are
the average hiring credit per employee and the hiring cost as dened in equation (A19). Following the
structural model, we control for the wage growth in small rms. To control for local shocks, we include
as covariates, the employment growth in rms with 10 to 14 full-time equivalent employees in the
previous year and the shift-share predictions of employment growth, dened as in the previous sections.
We also add the average 2006-2008 employment growth at the regional level, as above. We also control
for key cell characteristics: the distribution of rms age in the cell, the average share of part-time
workers, and the share of rms with sales below 2 million euros in the previous year. The average hiring
credit per employee and the hiring cost are instrumented by the corresponding average values of the
share of eligible hires, of the duration of job vacancies and of the job separation rate among rms with 6
to 10 full-time employees over 2006-2008. Weights are used: for each employment pool x sector unit the
weight equals total employment among rms with 6 to 10 full-time equivalent employees in the previous
year. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * signicant at 10 percent, ** signicant at 5 percent, ***
signicant at 1 percent.
7.3 Cost per job created in di¤erent contexts
Let us remind that temporary hiring credits are one-o¤ schemes that provide hiring sub-
sidies during specic periods, whereas permanent hiring credits provide them whatever
41This elasticity is dened by equation (F11) in appendix F.1.1.
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the timing of hiring. In both cases, the subsidy is paid for a short period of time (usu-
ally one year) following the hiring. Neumark and Grijalva (2015) report that 99 of the
147 hiring credits recorded in the United States over the period 1970-2012 are perma-
nent. There is also a great diversity of hiring credits in OECD countries (OECD, 2010).
Accordingly, it is worth analyzing in detail the consequences of di¤erent types of hiring
credits in di¤erent contexts. We rst consider the cost per job created when the hiring
credit is either (non-expected, one-o¤) temporary or permanent. We analyze these credits
when they are either targeted at a small subset of rms or accessible to all rms, and
when wages are either rigid or exible. A related issue concerns the feature of permanent
hiring credits, which can be time invariant, but also countercyclical, i.e. provided when
the economy slows down only. To deal with this issue, we use the equilibrium model to
explicitly simulate a context where the government is committed to provide the credits
when the economy slows down.
7.3.1 Permanent versus non-expected temporary hiring credits
In this section, we compare one-o¤ non-expected temporary hiring credits lasting one
year (like zéro charges) with time-invariant permanent hiring credits. Let us remind that
the cost per job created by a temporary hiring credit, set out for one year, corresponds
to the monthly cost necessary to create one supplementary job at the one-year time
horizon, whereas the cost per job created by a permanent hiring credit, set out without
any foreseen time limit, is the monthly cost necessary to create one supplementary job
permanently, i.e. on an innite time horizon. The costs per job created reported in Table
9, are computed using the elasticities of employment with respect to labor costs derived
from the structural model in the neighborhood of the steady state (see appendices F.1
and F.2). The steady state values of the model are computed over the 2005-2008 pre-
recession period used for the estimation of the structural parameters (see appendix F.3).
We evaluate the cost per job created for di¤erent values of the product market power of
rms. In line with available estimates (Bouis, 2008), the markup is set equal to 1.3 in
the benchmark case, corresponding to the actual situation in 2008. In the lower panels of
Table 9, we consider two alternative cases around this benchmark: zero markup, which
yields the constrained e¢ cient allocation when the wage is endogenous, and a markup
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higher than in the benchmark, equal to 1.6, which yields higher unemployment rate.
The importance of the duration of hiring credits
Table 9 shows that zéro charges was implemented in the most favorable situation: it
was temporary, targeted at a small subset of rms, and it occurred in a context where
wages were rigid. The cost per job created by a permanent hiring credit targeted at a
small subset of rms in the same environment would have been four times larger. This
result is an immediate consequence of the relation between the elasticity of employment
with respect to a change in average labor cost per job induced by a change in the wage
of all workers, "; and the elasticity of employment with respect to a change in average
labor cost per job induced by a temporary hiring credit, " = "= where  stands for the
share of employees that benet from the hiring credit on 30 November 2009 in rms with
positive take-up of zéro charges. In our setup,  is about 26%. When the hiring credit
becomes permanent,  goes to one and the cost per job created by the hiring credit is
increased by a factor of four.42 Accordingly, hiring credits are more e¤ective at creating
jobs at a low cost when they apply on short periods of time.
Targeted versus economy-wide hiring credit
Table 9 shows that the cost per job created by hiring credits accessible to all rms
is only slightly bigger than the cost per job created by hiring credits targeted at a small
subset of rms when the wage is exogenous. This means that hikes in recruitment costs
induced by the increase in the labor market tightness associated with economy-wide hiring
credits have only a small impact on employment. This result is the consequence of small
hiring costs as stressed above in section 7.2.2.
The adjustment of wages
The comparison of cases with endogenous and exogenous wages shows that the costs
per job created are very close in these two cases when the hiring credit is temporary.
Note that they are even identical when the hiring credit is targeted at a small subset
of rms. This result is a consequence of the assumption of decreasing marginal revenue.
This implies that each rm optimally increases the number of hires when the hiring credit
42The cost per job created of a permanent hiring credit is equal to that of permanent employment
subsidy if the rms and the government face the same interest rate, which is assumed here.
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Table 9: Cost per job created (in percentage of the wage) by hiring credits in di¤erent
contexts
Hiring credit: To small subset of rms To all rms
Temporary Permanent Temporary Permanent
Baseline mark-up: 1.3
Exogenous wage 25:2 96:9 25:7 102:9
Wage posting 25:2 96:9 26:1 217:0
High mark-up: 1.6
Exogenous wage 25:7 99:1 27:5 107:2
Wage posting 25:7 99:1 28:9 161:8
No mark-up
Exogenous wage 24:8 95:5 25:0 99:8
Wage posting 24:8 95:5 25:1 272:2
Note: The cost per job created is gross, and as such it does not account for the savings induced by job
creation in terms of unemployment and other social benets that would have been paid in the absence
of the measure. It also ignores the remaining social contributions paid by employees on these additional
jobs. Hiring credits which are targeted at "small subset of rms" entail no equilibrium e¤ects. Hiring
credits which are available to all rms entail equilibrium e¤ects. Temporary hiring credits are provided
for hirings occurring during a period of one year. Permanent hiring credits are time-invariant and
provided for hirings occurring at any moment. The cost per job created is computed using the formula
derived in appendices F1, F2 and F3. The annual discount factor, , is set to 0.95. The estimation of
the structural model yields:  = 0:45,  =  0:964 and the annual cost of a vacant job cv/w=0.056. The
separation rate, q, and the duration of job vacancies 1/m are computed from the DADS and Pole
emploi data. We get q=0.5, 1/m=0.2 on average over the period 2005-2008. The unemployment rate in
the benchmark situation reported in the top panel of the table is computed from the French Labor
Force Survey (Enquête emploi), which yields u=0.083. The share of employees that benet from the
hiring credit on 30 November 2009 in rms with positive take-up in 2009 is computed from the DADS
and from the "hiring credit le". We get  = 0:26. The costs per job created when the price mark-up is
high, and when competition is perfect, are reported in the middle and the bottom panel respectively.
These counterfactual environments are detailed in appendix F.3.
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is implemented instead of increasing the hiring wage as long as the labor market tightness
remains unchanged.43 In this context, an increase in the reservation wage of workers,
induced by the hike in the labor market tightness, is the only channel through which the
hiring credit exerts an impact on wages. Namely, in the period where the hiring credit is
implemented, rms are induced to post more job vacancies, which pushes the labor market
tightness up. The improvement in job nding raises the reservation wages and then the
equilibrium wages. The size of this e¤ect is smaller when the hiring credit is temporary
rather than permanent, as discussed above. Indeed, in our setup, this mechanism has a
small impact on employment creation when the hiring credit is temporary since it increases
the cost per job created by about one point of percentage. The small impact of the reaction
of wages relies in particular on the relative low elasticity of the job matching function with
respect to the unemployment rate, which is estimated at 0.45 in our framework.
Nevertheless, the reaction of wages has a very strong impact when hiring credits are
permanent: the cost per job created by an economy-wide permanent hiring credit is about
2 times higher than when wages are rigid.
The market power of rms
When rms have more power in the product market, the wage elasticity of employment
is smaller in absolute value ( is greater in absolute value - see details in appendix F.3).
This contributes to raising the cost per job created. The market power of rms has another
e¤ect that goes in the opposite direction. It increases unemployment, which decreases the
hiring costs and exerts a downwards pressure on wages, and then reduces the cost per job
created.
As shown by the lower panels of Table 9, the cost per job created increases with the
market power of rms in all cases except when the hiring credit is permanent and wages
are endogenous. It is clear that the market power of rms has a small impact on the cost
per job created for relevant values of the markup when the wage is rigid or when the hiring
credit is temporary. However, when the hiring credit is permanent and wages react, the
market power of rms can have a signicant impact on the cost per job created, which
43See the discussion in appendix, equation (F32). This mechanism is the consequence of decreasing
marginal productivity of labor. It also holds in a model with wage bargaining instead of wage posting. It
has been highlighted by Stole and Zwiebel (1996) and examined further in a search and matching model
by Cahuc et al. (2008).
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decreases by 100 percentage points when the markup goes from 1 to 1.6. In this case,
the further away from the constrained e¢ cient equilibrium, the more e¤ective the hiring
credit is to close the employment gap.
7.3.2 Countercyclical hiring credits
Our previous analysis compares (non-expected, one-o¤) temporary hiring credits with per-
manent time-invariant hiring credits. Since the cost of job creation is smaller in recession,
because the labor market tightness is smaller when unemployment is higher, the returns
of expenditure on hiring subsidies is larger in recession. This can justify a more intensive
use of hiring subsidies in recessions.44 In order to analyze countercyclical hiring credits,
provided when the economy slows down only, we assume that the economy uctuates ac-
cording to a Markov process between two states: a high-productivity low-separation state
with 7% steady state unemployment rate and a low-productivity high-separation state
with 11% steady state unemployment rate, consistent with the French economy over the
last 40 years (see appendix F.4). Table 10 reports the cost per job created by temporary
hiring credits lasting one year during a recession (in columns 1 and 4), by time-invariant
permanent hiring credits (in columns 2 and 5) and by countercyclical hiring credits trig-
gered during the whole recession periods which last 25 months on average in France (in
columns 3 and 6).45 Table 10 shows that the cost per job created by countercyclical hir-
ing credits is much higher than that of one-o¤ non-anticipated temporary hiring credits
lasting one year only.
A rst reason is that slowdowns last 25 months on average, implying that a larger
share of employees benet from the countercyclical credit than from the temporary hiring
credit (which by denition benets hires occurring over a one-year period only). This e¤ect
approximately doubles the cost of countercyclical hiring credits with respect to temporary
hiring credits lasting one year. Obviously, it would be smaller if the countercyclical hiring
44In the context of our model, recessions are driven by productivity shocks and there is no specic
source of ine¢ ciency during recessions which could justify the use of hiring credits. Countercyclical
markups could create such ine¢ ciencies. While there is some evidence that markups are countercyclical
(Rotemberg and Woodford, 1991, Chevalier and Scharfstein, 1996 and Wilson and Reynolds, 2005, Ravn,
Schmidt-Grohe and Uribe, 2006), there is no consensus of the empirical literature on this issue (Nekarda
and Ramey, 2013 and the articles they cite provide evidence for acyclicality or procyclicality of markups).
45The di¤erences between the costs per job created by temporary/time-invariant hiring credits in Table
9 and 10 are due to the fact that the baseline economies di¤er in both simulations sets.
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Table 10: Cost per job created (in percentage of the average wage) by temporary, time-
invariant and counter-cyclical hiring credits, along the business cycle.
Hiring credit: To small subset of rms To all rms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Temporary Invariant Countercyclical Temporary Invariant Countercyclical
Exogenous wage 25.2 97.2 49.9 26.1 106.1 53.4
Wage posting 25.2 97.2 49.9 26.8 256.2 101.0
Note: Hiring credits which are targeted at "small subset of rms" entail no equilibrium e¤ects. Hiring
credits which are available to all rms entail equilibrium e¤ects. Temporary hiring credits are
non-anticipated, one-o¤ and provided for hirings occurring over a period of one year during recessions.
Time-invariant hiring credits are provided at every moment. Countercyclical hiring credits are only
provided in periods of recession. The price markup of rms is set to 1.3. The cost per job created is
computed thanks to simulations of the 2-state search and matching model, described in appendix F.4.
Details about the calibration of the model are provided in appendix F.4.3. The cost per job created is
gross.
credit applied on shorter periods.
A second reason is that, since labor is less expensive during slowdowns thanks to the
countercyclical hiring credit, rms substitute jobs in slowdowns for jobs in expansions.
The e¤ect of this channel is quantitatively very small to the extent that it changes the
timing of job creation without modifying signicantly its impact on overall job creation
when wages remain constant.46
The third reason comes from the upward pressure on wages exerted by the increase
in hires induced by the countercyclical hiring credit in recessions. The last column of
Table 10 shows that this last e¤ect has a strong impact. When the hiring credit is
economy-wide, this last e¤ect approximately doubles the cost per job created when the
wage is endogenous compared to the exogenous wage case. Then the countercyclical hiring
credits is 4 times more costly than the one-o¤ temporary hiring credits. Such a di¤erence
cannot be explained by di¤erent shares of subsidized hires over employment only, as the
share of subsidized hires in countercyclical policies is twice the one in temporary credits.47
46 The comparison of columns 1 and 3 (or 4 and 6, row 1) of table 10 shows that the impact of
this channel on the cost per job created is quantitatively small, as the cost per job created by the
countercyclical hiring credit is about twice as high as that of the temporary credit. This factor almost
maps the ratio of average recession length 25 months to the shorter duration of the temporary credit,
which lasts 12 months. Consequently, the rst reason, related to the share of infra-marginal employees
in the rm, explains almost all the di¤erence in the cost per job created between one-o¤ non-expected
hiring credits and countercyclical hiring credits when the wage is exogenous.
47Moreover, in the economy-wide endogenous-wage case, assuming that slowdowns last 12 months -
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Therefore, the cost per job created by economy wide countercyclical hiring credits remains
high, even if it is signicantly lower than that of time-invariant hiring credits.
All in all, this analysis suggests, in line with the ndings of Kaas and Kircher (2015),
that there is little room for economy-wide permanent hiring credits, either time-invariant
or countercyclical, when wages can react.
8 Conclusion
This paper shows that a hiring credit targeted at small rms and low wage workers did
have a signicant impact on employment in France during the 2008-2009 recession. All in
all, the hiring credit was very e¤ective. It allowed the government to create jobs at zero
net cost in a short period of time.
The estimation of a search and matching model shows, however, that the e¤ectiveness
of this hiring credit relied on very special circumstances: it was (one-o¤, non-anticipated)
temporary, it was targeted at a small subset of rms and it was implemented in a context
with high binding wage oors and high unemployment. Among all these elements that
have favored the e¤ectiveness of the hiring credit, it appears that its temporary nature
was key. The one-o¤ non-anticipated temporary nature of the hiring credit allows the
government to lower the cost of entrants but not that of incumbent workers with limited
e¤ects on wages which need time to adjust. This implies that hiring credits can be e¤ective
to boost job creation at a low cost if they are non-anticipated and implemented on short
periods of time. The search and matching model suggests that this conclusion also holds
true for economy-wide hiring credits and even when the minimum wage is not binding.
Nevertheless, a counterpart of this positive conclusion is that hiring credits create jobs
at very high costs when they are permanent, either time-invariant or countercyclical,
especially when there are no high wage oors. This suggests that they should be avoided
in such circumstances.
Future research should aim at clarifying the di¤erential impact of hiring credits and
wage subsidies on job separations. In this paper, we found that job separations were
instead of 25 months- entails a cost per job created of 49.5% of the labor cost by countercyclical hiring
credits, which is about twice as high as that of the one-o¤ non expected temporary hiring credits of the
same duration.
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una¤ected by the one-o¤ hiring credit implemented during the 2008-2009 recession. Con-
sistently, job destruction is considered exogenous in the model used to obtain structural
estimates. However, in other settings, job destruction could be reduced by wage subsidies
or permanent hiring credits. In that case, their costs per job created could be lowered
compared with one-o¤, non-anticipated hiring credits.
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ONLINE APPENDIX
DATA ACCESS
The French employment registers (DADS) and the scal data (FICUS-FARE), used in this
paper, can be accessed by researchers. Authorization must be obtained rst from the comité du
secret. The procedure is described at https://www.comite-du-secret.fr. Then researchers use a
remote secure server (CASD) to work on the data.
The hiring credit le that contains information on the rms enrolled in the zéro charges
program, is produced and owned by the French Public Employment Service (Pôle emploi). This
is also the case for the vacancy data. Access to these data can be requested directly to Pôle
emploi.
The French Labor Force survey is produced by France Statistics (Institut National de la
Statistique et des Etudes Economiques, Insee). Researchers can access individual data from
the French LFS directly through Insee, or through the Quetelet network (http://www.reseau-
quetelet.cnrs.fr).
A E¤ects of the 2009 French hiring credit on wages
The hiring credit may raise individual net wages. It may also induce rms to hire workers with
fewer skills at lower wages, since the hiring credit decreases with the wage as shown on Figure
1 in the main text. To evaluate the impact of the hiring credit on wages, we use our di¤erence-
in-di¤erences approach, where the dependent variable is the di¤erence in log wages.48 Let wit
be the average hourly wage of workers in rm i in year t and ~wit 1 their average hourly wage in
the previous year (if they worked), either in rm i; or in any other rm. Workers who did not
work in the previous year are excluded49. For each rm i and year t; the dependent variable is
lnwit   ln ~wit 1 for all workers present in rm i on 30 November of year t: This variable allows
us to compare the evolution of wage changes in small and medium-sized rms controlling for
individual past wages. If the hiring credit did indeed have an impact on wages, that should be
apparent for the entrants eligible for the hiring credit  i.e. workers hired during the current
year, paid below 1.6 times the minimum wage, and who worked in the rm at least one month.
Figure A1 shows the evolution of the wages of these workers in the small and medium-sized
rms over the years 2006-2009. Contrary to what we see for employment and hours of work,
there is no break in the common trend in 2009. This suggests that the hiring credit had no
impact on wages. This is conrmed by Table A1 which displays the di¤erence-in-di¤erences
estimates for the wages of all workers, for the wages of incumbent workers paid below 1.6 times
the minimum wage, and for the wages of entrants eligible for the hiring credit. In all cases, the
estimates point to a null e¤ect of the hiring credit on wages. This result is not surprising in the
French context, where there is a high minimum wage and collective agreements that cover more
than 90 percent of employees and that are most often binding for small rms.
48Note that although the DADS is not a panel, it does provide the wage in the previous year for each
worker.
49This exclusion results in a lower number of observations than in Table 2.
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Figure A1: Average log wage di¤erence of entrants eligible for the hiring credit in rms
in the treated and control groups.
Note: Eligible entrants are workers hired during the current year, paid below 1.6 times the minimum
wage and who worked at least one month in the rm. The average log wage di¤erence for each group is
1
Ni
P
i lnwit  ln ~wit 1 where wit is the average hourly wage of eligible entrants in rm i in year t and
~wit 1 their average hourly wage in the previous year, if they worked, either in rm i; or in any other rm;
Ni is the number of rms in the group. The treatment group comprises rms of size between 6 (included)
and 10 (excluded) full-time equivalent employees in the previous year (average from 1 December to 30
November). The control group comprises rms of size between 10 (included) and 14 (excluded) full time
equivalent employees in the previous year (average from 1 December to 30 November).
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Table A1: Di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates of the impact of the hiring credit on wages
in 2009
Cohorts 2006-2009 2006-2009 2008-2009
Covariates No Yes Yes
All wages :000
(:001)
 :001
(:001)
:000
(:002)
Low wage incumbents :000
(:001)
 :001
(:001)
:000
(:001)
Eligible entrants :000
(:002)
:000
(:002)
 :001
(:002)
Nb. Observations 210; 652 210; 652 105; 333
Source : DADS (Insee). Note : this Table presents our di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates for di¤erent
outcomes (rows) and di¤erent specications (columns). The treatment group comprises rms of size
between 6 (included) and 10 (excluded) full-time equivalent employees in the previous year (average
from 1 January to 30 November). The control group comprises rms of size between 10 (included) and
14 (excluded) full-time equivalent employees in the previous year (average from 1 January to 30
November). We consider as outcomes the di¤erences in log hourly wages between 30 November of year
t-1 and year t; All wagesstands for the wages of all workers present in the rm on 30 November of
year t. Low wage incumbentsstands for the wages below 1.6 times the minimum wage of workers
present in the rm from 30 November of year t-1 to 30 November of year t. Eligible entrantsstands
for the wages below 1.6 times the minimum wage of workers present in the rm on 30 November of year
t but not present in the rm on 30 November of year t-1 and who have been working at least one month
in the rm. As covariates, we include year, sector and regions dummies, as well as their interactions; we
also include dummies for rm age, rms with sales below 2 million euros in the previous year, the share
of low-wage and part-time workers in the previous year and the shares of female or male workers with
di¤erent occupations (managers, white-collar or blue-collar workers). Robust standard deviations in
parentheses. * signicant at 10 percent, ** signicant at 5 percent, *** signicant at 1 percent.
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B E¤ects of the 2009 French hiring credit on churn-
ing and separations
Table 2 in the main text shows that the hiring credit has a positive, although non-signicant,
impact on the separation rate. Consistent with this result, the hiring credit has a bigger impact
on the hiring rate than on employment growth, although the di¤erence is not signicantly
di¤erent from zero. It may be suspected that this result reects some strategic behavior of rms
which might replace incumbent workers with new workers to benet from the hiring credit.
Let us provide evidence which suggests that this is not the case. Using French data over
the period 1987-1990, Abowd et al. (1999) estimate that each job created in a given year is
associated with 3 hires and 2 separations. Davis et al. (2012) also nd that hires rise more
than one-for-one with job creation in the US. This relation indicates that a higher incidence of
recently formed matches at more rapidly growing rms generates higher separation rates. There
are two reasons for this. One is purely mechanical: at given quit rate, the separation rate,
equal to the number of separations during the period divided by employment at the beginning
of the period (or by the average of employment at the beginning and at the end of the period),
increases when employment grows faster. Another reason ows from the fact that lling a job
requires nding the right match with the right worker, which is not always the case with the
rst hire. Accordingly, if the hiring credit fosters job creation, it may also increase churning,
even in the case where rms to do not strategically raise their separations in order to hire new
workers at lower cost.50
The upper chart of Figure A2 shows the relation between the hiring rate and the employment
growth rate in small-size and medium-size rms over the period 2006-2008. The vertical axis
displays the average annual hiring rate51 by growth rate bins. Hires increase more than one-for-
one with job creation in all rms. Over the period 2006-2008, the relation between hires and
employment growth is similar in small-size and in medium-size rms.
If the hiring credit had induced employers to replace incumbent workers with new workers
to benet from the subsidy in 2009, the hiring rate, at a given employment growth rate, would
have been higher in small rms, eligible for the hiring credit, than it was in medium-size rms
not eligible for the hiring credit. The bottom panel of Figure A2 shows that this is not the case.
The relation between hires and employment growth is similar in small-size and medium-size
rms before and after 2009. This means that the hiring credit did not induce rms to increase
labor turnover in order to benet from the subsidy.
50Assume that each hire induces s separations. If s remains constant, the separation rate, dened as
S=L 1 increases with H: This is also the case if the separation rate is dened as 2S=(L + L 1), as in
Davis et al. (1996).
51The hiring rate of year t is the number of hires from 1 December of year t   1 to 30 November of
year t divided by employment on 30 November of year t  1:
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Figure A2: Hiring rate and employment growth rate in small size and medium size rms.
Note: The upper chart displays the average of the mean hiring rate by employment growth rate bins
over 2006-2008. The bottom chart displays the average hiring rate by employment growth rate bins in
2009. Dots represent 6-bin moving averages. Small size rms have 6-10 (excluded) full-time equivalent
employees in the previous year. Medium size rms have 10-14 full-time equivalent employees in the
previous year. Source: DADS.
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C Robustness checks
In this appendix we perform a number of additional estimations to check the robustness of our
baseline results. We run year placebo tests. We also consider placebo size cuto¤s and changes
in the bandwidth.
C.1 Year placebo tests
We perform a series of year placebo tests using cohorts from 2006 to 2008. We use the speci-
cation of column 3 in Table 2 as if the policy had been implemented in December 2006 (using
cohorts 2006 and 2007) or December 2007 (using cohorts 2006, 2007 and 2008). Table A2 shows
that employment, hours, hires and separations of the treatment and the control groups did not
evolve di¤erently either in 2007 or in 2008, contrary to 2009 when zéro charges was introduced.
These results reinforce the relevance of the common trend assumption. They also rule out the
possibility that our estimates of the impact of zéro charges are driven by reversion to the mean.
We also perform year placebo tests of our alternative IV strategy. We consider the following
reduced-form equation on three di¤erent samples (cohorts 2007, 2008 and 2009):
Yjkt = + E
t 1
jk + Xjkt + vjkt (C1)
where Yjkt is the employment growth rate between November t   1 and November t averaged
across eligible rms (with 6 to 10 employees in year t) in commuting zone j and producing
in sector k, Et 1jk is the share of eligible hires (below 1.6 the minimum wage) in small rms
in t-1, Xjkt is the set of controls at the cell level. Recall that E
t 1
jk is our instrument. Xjkt
comprises sector dummies, and cell-level measures of rms age, of part-time incidence, of
sales/value-added/dividend/interest payments per employee in the previous year and average
nancial leverage ratio over the pre-policy period from 2006 to 2008. It also includes the lagged
outcome Yjkt 1, and the employment growth rate of the control group in the same cell -rms with
size between 10 and 14. Table A3 reports the estimates of the coe¢ cient  of the instrument.
It is small and non statistically signicant when the equation is estimated as if the policy had
taken place in 2007 or 2008 (Columns (1) and (2)). In Column (3), it is as expected larger and
statistically signicant at the 5% level. Overall Table A3 conrms our alternative identications
strategy.
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Table A2: Di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates for various labor market outcomes in placebo
years
Placebo December 2006 December 2007
Cohorts 2006-2007 2006-2008
Covariates Yes Yes
Employment growth  :002
(:002)
:001
(:002)
Hours growth  :003
(:002)
:001
(:002)
Hiring rate  :001
(:005)
 :004
(:003)
Separation rate :001
(:005)
 :005
(:003)
Survival rate :002
(:001)
:001
(:001)
Nb. Observations 179; 381 270; 593
Source : DADS (Insee). Note : this Table presents our di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates for di¤erent
outcomes (rows) and di¤erent placebo years (columns, 12 months starting from December 2006 or 2007,
instead of 2009). The treatment group comprises rms of size between 6 (included) and 10 (excluded)
full-time equivalent employees in the previous year (average from 1 January to 30 November). The
control group comprises rms of size between 10 (included) and 14 (excluded) full time equivalent
employees in the previous year (average from 1 January to 30 November). We consider as outcomes the
growth rate of employment between 30 November of year t and year t-1; the growth rate of the number
of hours worked between November of year t and November of year t-1; the number of hires from 1
December of year t-1 to 30 November of year t divided by employment on 30 November of year t-1; the
number of separations from 1 December of year t-1 to 30 November of year t divided by employment on
30 November of year t-1; and the number of excess reallocation from 1 December of year t-1 to 30
November of year t divided by employment on 30 November of year t-1. As covariates, we include year,
sector and regions dummies, as well as their interactions; we also include dummies for rm age, rms
with sales below 2 millions euros in the previous year, the share of low-wage and part-time workers in
the previous year and the shares of female or male workers with di¤erent occupations (managers,
white-collar or blue-collar workers). Robust standard deviations in parentheses. * signicant at 10
percent, ** signicant at 5 percent, *** signicant at 1 percent.
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Table A3: Placebo-year estimates of the impact of the hiring credit on employment growth
rates in the IV strategy
(1) (2) (3)
Placebo December 2006 December 2007 No
Main cohort 2007 2008 2009
Covariates Yes Yes Yes
Employment growth
Share of eligible hires in previous year :009
(:013)
:015
(:012)
:026
(:012)
R2 :060 :054 :048
Nb. Observations 1; 647 1; 646 1; 655
Source : DADS (Insee). Note : This table presents the reduced-form estimate of our IV strategy (last
column, year=2009) and placebo reduced-form estimates from 2007 to 2008 (Columns (1) to (2)).
Estimates are thus based on cross-cell di¤erences in the eligible hires -low-wage hires lasting more than
one month- in the previous year. Each cell corresponds to one employment pool and one sector. Within
each cell the group of interest comprises rms of size between 6 (included) and 10 (excluded) full-time
equivalent employees in the previous year (average from 1 January to 30 November). Each cell is
weighted by its relative employment size as measured among 6-10 employees rms. We consider as
outcome the growth rate of employment between 30 November of year t-1 and year t. Covariates
include the distribution of rmsage in the cell, the share of rms with sales below 2 million euros in
the previous year, the share of part-time workers in the previous year, the
sales/value-added/interest/dividend payments in the previous year, the nancial leverage ratio (debt
over equity) in the previosu year, the lagged outcome, and the employment growth rate of the control
group in the same cell -rms with size between 10 and 14. Robust standard deviations in parentheses. *
signicant at 10 percent, ** signicant at 5 percent, *** signicant at 1 percent.
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C.2 Size placebo tests
A potential concern is that our results may reect the fact that rms of di¤erent sizes behave
di¤erently during the business cycle, especially at the beginning of recessions. Moscarini and
Postel Vinay (2012) have shown that large rms (above 500 employees) destroy proportionally
more jobs in net terms relative to small rms (below 20 employees) when unemployment is
above trend in France. This phenomenon is not necessarily a concern in our case, because
the di¤erence in the rm size in our control and treatment groups is very small compared to
the situation studied by Moscarini and Postel-Vinay. Nevertheless, we check that there is no
systematic di¤erence in the evolution of employment and hours across rms of di¤erent size in
2009.
If rms of size between 6 and 10 employees in 2008 behaved di¤erently in 2009 from rms
of size between 10 to 14 employees because of di¤erences in size and not because of the hiring
credit, we would expect rms with 13 to 16 employees to behave di¤erently from rms with
16 to 19 employees.52 Figure A3 compares the average employment growth rate for rms with
13 to 16 (excluded) employees in previous year and rms with 16 to 19 employees in previous
year. The di¤erence in employment growth across these groups does not change in 2009. This
result is conrmed by the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates for these two groups of rms.53 This
indicates that the di¤erence in employment growth across our treatment and control groups does
not stem from di¤erences in behavior due to di¤erences in size.
C.3 Changing the bandwidth
Our benchmark di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates are based on a sample which includes some
treated rms featuring a lower take-up than others (between 8 and 10 employees), and a residual
take-up among control rms (between 10 and 12 employees, see Figure 4). Table A4 presents
the estimates for di¤erent bandwidths. The di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates are higher when
the treatment group includes rms with higher take-up rates (column 1 to 3). Column 4 shows
that the estimates are also higher when the control group excludes rms with residual take-up.
The corresponding estimates of elasticity of employment with respect to the change in labor
cost induced by zéro charges equal  1:43 and  1:95 when the bandwidth goes from 5 to 15
employees and falls in the range [5,8]-[13,16] employees, respectively.54 All in all, these results
suggest that our benchmark estimate of the elasticity of employment with respect to the change
in labor cost induced by the hiring credit is conservative: it is likely a lower bound for the
elasticity that might be larger than 4 in absolute value.
52We avoid making comparisons using rms with 10 to 12 employees in the previous year, only a tiny
fraction of which have beneted from the subsidy as shown by gure 4.
53We do not present these estimates to save space. The results are available upon request.
54As explained in footnote 28 these elasticities imply labor demand elasticity with respect to the wage
equal to  1:43 =  5:5 0:26 and  1:95 =  7:5 0:26 respectively.
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Figure A3: Average employment growth rates in placebo groups.
Note: Growth rate of employment between 30 November of year t  1 and year t. One group comprises
rms of size between 13 (included) and 16 (excluded) full-time equivalent employees in the previous year
(average from 1 December to 30 November). The other group comprises rms of size from 16 (included)
to 19 full-time equivalent employees in the previous year.
Table A4: Di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates of the impact of the hiring credit in 2009 on
various labour market outcome with a varying bandwidth.
Size bandwidth 7-13 6-14 5-15 [5,8]-[13,16]
Employment growth :005
(:002)
 :008
(:002)
 :011
(:002)

:015
(:002)

Hours growth :006
(:002)
 :009
(:002)
 :012
(:002)

:016
(:002)

Hiring rate :013
(:005)

:012
(:004)
 :015
(:004)
 :016
(:005)

Separation rate :007
(:005)
:004
(:004)
:004
(:004)
:001
(:005)
Survival rate :000
(:001)
:000
(:001)
:000
(:001)
:000
(:001)
Nb. Observations 284; 483 406; 468 550; 524 364; 029
Source : DADS (Insee). Note : this Table displays the DID estimates varying the bandwidth (in
colums). The sample contains all available cohorts (2006-2009), and we include covariates presented in
table 2. The 2nd column is identical to column (2) of table 2 We consider as outcomes the growth rate
of employment between 30 November of year t and year t-1; the growth rate of the number of hours
worked between November of year t and November of year t-1; Robust standard deviations in
parentheses. * signicant at 10 percent, ** signicant at 5 percent, *** signicant at 1 percent.
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C.4 Equilibrium e¤ects beyond the commuting zone  sector
cells
Our benchmark analysis of equilibrium e¤ects restricts their scope to commuting zone  sector
cells. In this appendix, we show that there are no evidence that the 2009 hiring credit triggered
equilibrium e¤ects beyond these boundaries. We augment model (5) in the main text with the
share of subsidized hires in the same commuting zone, but in di¤erent sectors, and with the
share of subsidized hires in the same sector, but in di¤erent commuting zones. The augmented
model writes:
Yjk = + 1Sjk + 2Sj( k) + 3S( j)k + Xjk + ujk (C2)
where Yjk stands for the employment growth of rms with 10 to 20 employees in 2008 in employ-
ment pool j and sector k, Sjk is the ratio of subsidized hires in 2009 to all hires observed in the
same year among rms with 0 to 20 full-time equivalent employees in 2008, Sj( k) is the number
of subsidized hires in 2009 divided by all hires in the same year in rms with 0 to 20 employees
operating in employment pool j and belonging to sectors other than k; and S( j)k is the number
of subsidized hires in 2009 divided by all hires in 2008 in rms with 0 to 20 employees operating
in employment pools other than j but belonging to sector k. The term ujk is a residual. In this
setting Sjk and Sj( k) together account for the equilibrium e¤ects that may occur within the
employment pool j whatever the sector, while S( j)k accounts for the equilibrium e¤ects that
could arise from interactions with rms in the same sector as the unit under consideration but
outside the employment pool j: We also include a number of cell-specic controls Xjk as in the
main model. If the sum of coe¢ cients  is signicantly di¤erent from zero, this indicates the
presence of equilibrium e¤ects. As in the main text, the ratios S of subsidized hires in 2009 are
instrumented by the corresponding shares of eligible hires in 2008 among all hires the same year
(when the subsidy was not yet implemented).
Column 1 of Table A5 present the results of the OLS estimation of equation (5) when
controls are not included. The sum of coe¢ cients  is then statistically signicant di¤erent
from 0. However, the level of signicance largely increases when the shares are instrumented,
even without further controls (see Column 3). As soon as controls are included, the sum of
coe¢ cients  is no longer statistically signicant, whether they are estimated according to an
OLS or they are obtained with an IV strategy. Table A6 shows the estimation results of the
rst stage equations and conrms that our instrument correlates well with the shares S. All in
all, these results suggest that the hiring credit had no impact on the medium-sized rms, even
in markets larger than the commuting zone  sector cell.
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Table A5: Cross-unit estimates of equilibrium e¤ects on the growth rates of employment
in 2009 among rms with 10-20 employees, based on OLS and IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV 2SLS - Second stage
Covariates No Yes No Yes
Sjk :068

(:027)
:041
(:025)
:111
(:067)
:069
(:068)
Sj( k)  :040
(:030)
 :032
(:029)
 :045
(:072)
 :019
(:061)
S( j)k :095
(:044)
:021
(:452)
:063
(:074)
 :357
(:500)
Test Sjk + Sj( k) + S( j)k = 0
(p-value)
:007 :946 :089 :542
R2 :026 :105
Nb. Observations 1; 686 1; 686 1; 686 1; 686
Source : DADS (Insee). Note: The dependent variable is the average growth rate of employment over
12 months from 1 December 2008 to 30 November 2009 in each employment pool x sector unit, among
rms with 10 to 14 full-time equivalent employees in the previous year. The independent variables are
the ratios of subsidized hires, which correspond to three variables: (1) the number of subsidized hires in
2009 divided by the number of hires in the employment pool x sector unit in 2008, among rms with 0
to 14 full-time equivalent employees in the previous year; (2) the same ratio but measured among rms
belonging to the same employment pool and to other sectors than the one considered for the dependent
variable; (3) the same ratio but measured among rms belonging to the same sector and to other
employment pools than the one considered for the dependent variable. In the IV regressions, these
ratios are instrumented by the corresponding shares of eligible hires in 2008, i.e. the ratios of the
eligible hires in 2008 to total hires in 2008, among rms with 0 to 14 full-time employees in the previous
year. As covariates, we include dummies for distribution of rmsage, the share of rms with sales
below 2 million euros in the previous year, the share of part-time workers in the previous year, change
in the survival rate of rms within the cell between 2008 and 2009, as well as the employment growth
rate in 2009 in the same sector as the cell but in employment zones located nearby. Weights are used:
for each employment pool x sector unit the weight equals total employment among rms with less than
14 full-time equivalent employees in the previous year. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *
signicant at 10 percent, ** signicant at 5 percent, *** signicant at 1 percent.
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Table A6: First stage of the instrumental variable estimates of extended equilibrium
e¤ects.
IV 2SLS - First stage
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes
Sjk Sj( k) S( j)k
Ejk :404

(:025)
:341
(:028)
:183
(:047)
:062
(:020)
:004
(:004)
:003
(:001)
Ej( k) :441
(:037)
:345
(:031)
:693
(:026)
:647
(:027)
 :000
(:009)
 :011
(:003)
E( j)k :286
(:027)
:239
(:237)
 :057
(:030)
 :464
(:248)
:617
(:004)
:554
(:052)
Test Ejk = Ej( k) = E( j)k = 0 (p-value) :0000 :0000 :0000 :0000 :0000 :0000
Nb. Observations 1; 686 1; 686 1; 686 1; 686 1; 686 1; 686
Source : DADS (Insee). Note: The dependent variables are the ratios of subsidized hires, which
correspond to three variables: First panel: the number of subsidized hires in 2009 divided by the
number of hires in the employment pool x sector unit in the same year, among rms with 0 to 14
full-time equivalent employees in the previous year. Second panel: the same ratio but measured among
rms belonging to the same employment pool and to other sectors than the one considered for the
dependent variable. Third Panel: the same ratio but measured among rms belonging to the same
sector and to other employment pools than the one considered for the dependent variable. The
independent variables are the instruments used in the second stage, i.e. the corresponding shares of
eligible hires in 2008 (i.e. the ratios of the eligible hires in 2008 to total hires in the same year, among
rms with 0 to 14 full-time equivalent employees in the previous year) As covariates, we include
dummies for distribution of rmsage, the share of female or male workers with di¤erent occupations
(managers, white-collar or blue-collar workers), lagged employment growth and lagged hiring rate rates,
the change in the survival rate of rms within the unit between 2008 and 2009, as well as the
employment growth rate in 2009 in the same sector as the unit but in employment zones located nearby.
Weights are used: for each employment pool x sector unit the weight equals total employment among
rms with less than 14 full-time equivalent employees in the previous year. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. * signicant at 10 percent, ** signicant at 5 percent, *** signicant at 1 percent.
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D Computation of net cost per job created
In order to evaluate the savings permitted by zéro charges on social benets, we use a survey
conducted by the Public Employment Service Pôle Emploi in November - December 2009 on
the beneciaries of zéro charges. Pôle Emploi interviewed 3,083 rms and a total of 3,996
employees who beneted from zéro charges between 1 January and 30 June 2009, out of 270,755
beneciaries recorded during that period. The survey collected the gender, age, and education
of the recruits, the main reason for recruitment (creation of a new job, replacement of another
worker, contract renewal, temporary needs, etc.), as well as the type of contract (permanent
or temporary), the profession, the monthly wage and the sector of rms. More interestingly, it
also included a question on the personal situation of workers immediately before the recruitment
took place: employed, registered or unregistered unemployed, in training or at school, on sick
or maternal leave, or inactive. The corresponding breakdown is presented in Table A7 for
workers less than 26 years old (64% of the recruits) and those 26 years old or more. We use this
information to estimate the savings on social benets induced by the jobs created by zéro charges.
To do so we compute the social benets that would have been received by the beneciaries if
they had remained on the dole.
Table A7: The situation of workers hired with zéro charges, immediately before recruit-
ment
Employed
Registered
unemployed
Unregistered
unemployed
Training Education
Other
Inactive
Less than 26 years old 29% 36% 5% 5% 18% 7%
26 years old or more 42% 39% 5% 4% 4% 8%
Source : Pole Emploi.
In 2009, the average unemployment insurance benet (calledAllocation de Retour à lEmploi)
was 970 euros per month, but only 50% of the registered unemployed received it (DARES, 2012).
About 10% received unemployment assistance (called Allocation de Solidarité Spécique, a means
tested scheme) which amounted to 450 euros. Another 10% received the minimum income (called
Revenu de Solidarité Active, also about 450 euros for a single person without children), and 30%
did not receive any benet. This gives a (weighted) average cost of 575 euros for the registered
unemployed. As for those not registered, they do not receive unemployment benets as reg-
istration is a prior condition. But they are eligible for the minimum income of 450 euros per
month, which inactive people are as well, for which studies show a typical take-up rate of 2/3.55
This provides an average cost of 300 euros per month for the unregistered unemployed and the
other inactive individuals, but only for those 26 years old or older, since younger unemployed
/ inactive people are not eligible for this minimum income scheme. Students may be eligible
for scholarships, but these are rather rare. The main benet for students is one of the three
main housing benets schemes, the average amount of which is about 200 euros per month. We
apply the same take-up of 2/3, as for the minimum income, which gives an average benet of 133
55See http://www.social-sante.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/1_Le_non-recours_au_rSa_et_ses_motifs.pdf
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euros per month for students. For trainees, there is a specic benet (called ARE formation) for
those unemployed and eligible for the insurance benet, which was 975 euros on average in 2009.
Since only about half of the unemployed are eligible for the insurance benet, we apply a take-up
rate of 50%, which gives a monthly cost of about 485 euros. There might be other benets for
non-employed trainees but they are scarcer and we neglect them. Finally, we consider that, in
the absence of the jobs created by zéro charges, those employed immediately before being hired
on these jobs would have been unemployed otherwise, and would then have received the same
average benet as the registered unemployed (since they would have just ended an employment
period, they would probably have registered rather than forgo job search support and unemploy-
ment benets). Adding all these benets, and using the weights of the various populations (less
or more than 26 years old, and by status), as provided in Table A7, gives an average benet per
worker of 460 euros per month. To these savings one must add the social contributions paid by
the additional employees hired on jobs created by zéro charges, which amount to 23% of gross
wages, or about 235 euros per month on average given the observed hiring wages. All in all, each
job created by zéro charges generates monthly net savings of 695 euros. This estimate excludes
the cost of social in-kind services (such as counselling, case-management and health services)
typically more important for unemployed and inactive persons than for those in employment. It
also takes into account only the basic amount of the minimum income, excluding all supplements
for couples and children.
E Estimation of the search and matching model
This appendix presents the estimation of the parameters of equations (7) and (8).
E.1 Matching technology
We rst estimate the parameters of the matching function mt: m and . Taking logs of the
denition of the matching technology, we obtain the following underlying structural relation :
log (H=U) = (1  ) log (V=U) + 
where  = log m. We use variations across employment pools over time to identify the parameter
. Let us denote j the employment pool (commuting zone). Yearly data on unemployment stocks
(Ujt) at the employment pool level are computed by the French statistical institute (Insee) using
the French Labor Force Survey (Enquête Emploi). Vacancies data (Vjt) come from the French
Employment Service (Pôle emploi). Pôle emploi posts vacancies that rms send to the Agency.
This is a free service and Pôle emploi estimates that they deal with almost 50% of the total of
French vacancies. Combining these data, we measure the tightness jt at the employment pool
level. Hiring data (Hjt) are observed in our main dataset DADS. Let us denote fjt the yearly
job nding rate (Hjt=Ujt). We estimate the following equation
log fjt = a1 log jt +
X
t
bt1 [year = t] + cj + jt (E3)
where j is one of the 348 employment pools (commuting zones) and the year t varies from 2006
to 2009, as in the main text. The estimation controls for year dummies and employment pool
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xed e¤ects (cj). The equation is estimated both by standard (within) OLS and IV regression.
As an instrument for the current labor market tightness we use past values of the labor market
tightness. This addresses potential endogeneity issues (see Borowczik et al. 2013). For instance,
an improvement in the matching technology (increase in m) can increase  and reduce the
unemployment rate.
Table 7 shows the estimates of the coe¢ cient a1 using OLS in column 1 and using IV in
column 2. Both estimates are highly signicant. Taking the IV estimation as our preferred
estimate, ; the elasticity of the matching function with respect to the unemployment rate,
amounts to 0:45.
E.2 Revenue function and vacancy posting costs
We now estimate the parameters of the revenue function and the search cost: A;; cV . Assuming
that cV =m is small with respect to w the labor demand in period t can be written:
logRL(Lt) = log (wt) +
cV
wt

1
mt
  (1  qt)
mt+1

  t; (E4)
where t = log(At). Estimating directly (E4) is plagued with well-known endogeneity issues be-
tween the wage level and the productivity level. Relying on our specic exogenous policy shock,
we set out an alternative structural estimation. In 2009, when the hiring credit is implemented,
the structural demand equation can be written:
logRL(Lt) = log (wt   ) + cV
wt   

1
mt
  (1  qt)
mt+1

  t: (E5)
We can then compute the rst di¤erence between equation (E5) (in 2009) and equation (E4) (in
2008) for rms eligible for the hiring credit.
 logRL(Lt) = log

wt   
wt 1

+cV

1
wt   

1
mt
  (1  qt)
mt+1

  1
wt 1

1
mt 1
  (1  qt 1)
mt

 t;
where  is the di¤erence operator: xt = xt   xt 1:We take a rst order approximation of
logRL(Lt) in the neighborhood of Lt = Lt 1 and obtain that  logRL(Lt) =  logLt: This
simplies the left-hand side of the above expression. Then, as =wt 1 is negligible compared to
1, we can simplify the right-hand side and get the the following structural equation:
 logLt =   
wt
+log

wt
wt 1

+
cV
wt

1
1  =wt

1
mt
  (1  qt)
mt+1

  wt
wt 1

1
mt 1
  (1  qt 1)
mt

 t:
(E6)
We aggregate the analysis at the employment pool  sector level. This is the ner level at
which we observe the duration of vacancies. We again use administrative data on the vacancies
posted at the Public Employment Service. We then compute the average duration of vacancies
(1=mjkt) posted by rms of commuting zone j in sector k. We compute the average wage wjkt
and the average job separation rates qjkt from the DADS database. The amount of the hiring
credit obtained by small rms jk comes from the hiring credit lewhich contains information
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on the rms enrolled in the zéro charges program. Assuming that  = 0:95; we compute from
these aggregates the di¤erence in hiring costs:
HirCostjkt =

1
1  jk=wjkt

1
mjkt
  (1  qjkt)
mjkt+1

  wjkt
wjkt 1

1
mjkt 1
  (1  qjkt 1)
mjkt

:
We estimate the following econometric equation:
 logLjkt = a1
jk
wjkt
+ b1HirCostjkt + c1 logwjkt + c2 logL
med
jkt + c3Xjkt + jkt (E7)
where j stands for employment pool and k for sector, and t is year 2009.  logLmedjkt is the
employment growth rate of medium-sized rms between 2008 and 2009 in employment pool j
and sector k. Xjkt is a set of covariates characterizing the population of small rms in the
corresponding cell.
The above specication directly relies on variation in the labor cost due to the hiring credit
to estimate the labor demand elasticity, as such it circumvents the classical endogeneity issue
of the wage. However, it can still be the case that the take-up rate, and consequently the
amount of hiring credit, is correlated with local shocks in 2009 or unobserved factors of the cell
associated with employment growth. For example, a positive productivity shock stimulates both
employment and the average amount of subsidy (via a greater number of subsidized hires). This
is the same endogeneity issue as in the IV identication strategy presented in the main text.
The identication strategy is then as follows: rst, we control for market-level covariates and
market-level employment growth shift-share predictions, and for the employment growth in the
control group; second, we use the average values of the share of eligible hires, of the duration
of job vacancies and of the job separation rate of rms with 6 to 10 full-time employees over
2006-2008, as instruments for the amount of the subsidy received in 2009 and for the hiring cost.
Estimates of a1 and b1 using this strategy are shown in table 8. They are signicantly di¤erent
from zero.
The mapping between the coe¢ cients of the econometric model and the parameters of the
structural equation yields: a1 =   1 and b1 = 1 cVwt : This shows that the parameters  and
cV
wt
are identied as  =   1a1 and
cV
wt
=   b1a1 . Taking the IV estimation of Table 8 as our preferred
estimate (column 2), we obtain ^ =  :964; ^c=w = :058.
F Employment elasticities
This appendix presents the computation of the elasticity of employment with respect to changes
in the labor cost induced by the hiring credit in di¤erent contexts. First, we show how these
elasticities can be computed from the parameters of the structural model where the wage is
either exogenous or endogenous. Second, we introduce aggregate shocks in the model to analyze
the cost per job created of countercyclical hiring credits.
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F.1 Elasticity of employment with exogenous wage
F.1.1 Micro elasticity of employment with exogenous wage
This appendix presents the model of the rm used to compute the elasticity of employment with
respect to the average labor cost per worker and the cost per job created induced by a hiring
credit. We consider a discrete time economy with a large number of labor pools or islands
in which a representative rm produces a di¤erentiated product with labor only as in the Dixit
and Stiglitz (1977) model. Each rm produces a di¤erentiated product in quantity Yi;t sold at
price Pi;t at date t and faces a demand for its product of the form:
Yi;t = P
 E
i;t ; E > 1:
where E is the price elasticity of demand. The demand function is derived from the maximization
problem of a representative consumer who maximizes the discounted utility of the aggregate
consumption index:
Ct =
24X
i;t
Y
E 1
E
i;t
35 EE 1
subject to his budget constraint. Let us assume that the production function of the rm is:
F (Li;t) = BtL
1+
i;t , with Bt > 0:
We can write the revenue function of the rm:
AtR(Li;t)  Pi;tF (Li;t) = At
1 + 
L1+i;t :
where
 =
(E   1)  1
E
;At =
(+ 1)(E   1)
E
B
E 1
E
t
Henceforth, subscript i is discarded when not necessary for the sake of simplicity. The rm
needs to post vacant jobs to hire workers. A vacant job costs cV units of output per period. In
each period, the sequence of decisions is as follows: 1) an exogenous proportion qt 1 of workers
quit the rm; 2) vacant jobs are posted; 3) workers are hired; 4) production takes place and
wages are paid. A vacant job posted in period t is matched with a worker with probability
mt 2 [0; 1] in the period and remains vacant with probability 1   mt. The probability to ll
a vacant job is determined by a matching function: m(t) = m
 
t ; where t = Vt=Ut 1; equal
to the ratio of the number of job vacancies Vt over the number of unemployed workers Ut 1,
denotes the labor market tightness; m is a positive parameter and  belongs to the interval
(0; 1):
Let us denote by wt the wage in period t and by (Zt; Lt 1) the value function of the rm,
where Zt = (At; wt;mt; qt 1): Let  denotes the discount factor and Et the expectation operator.
The value function of the rm satises
(Zt; Lt 1) = max
Vt
AtR(Lt)  wtLt   cV Vt + Et(Zt+1; Lt)
subject to the law of motion of employment:
Lt = (1  qt 1)Lt 1 +mtVt (F8)
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For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that the constraint Vt  0 is never binding. The rst
order condition is
AtRL(Lt)  wt + Et [L(Zt+1; Lt)] = cV
mt
(F9)
The envelope theorem together with the rst order condition (F9) implies that in every
period
L(Zt; Lt 1) =
(1  qt 1)cV
mt
(F10)
Thus, the rst order condition implies that employment is dened by
AtRL(Lt) = wt +
cV
mt
  Et

(1  qt)cV
mt+1

This equation implies that the elasticity of employment with respect to the contemporaneous
wage is, in the neighborhood of steady state:
" =
dLt
dwt
wt
Lt
=
w


w + 1 (1 q)m cV
 (F11)
where  = LRLL(L)=RL(L) stands for the elasticity of the marginal productivity of labor with
respect to labor. Now, assume that there is a non-anticipated temporary hiring subsidy in period
t denoted by t. The prot in period t is
AtR(Lt)  wtLt   (cV  mtt)Vt (F12)
This implies that the rst order condition in period t for the optimal choice of Vt is:
AtRL(Lt) = wt   t + cV
mt
  Et

(1  qt)cV
mt+1

(F13)
The average labor cost per worker in a rm with Lt workers and Ht hires that gets a hiring
credit t per hire boils down to:
 t = wt   tHt
Lt
(F14)
The elasticity of employment with respect to the average labor cost per worker when the
change in labor cost is due to the temporary hiring subsidy t, is:
" =  dLtdt
dt
d t
 t
Lt
Equations (F11), (F13) and (F14) imply, in the neighborhood of steady state and  = 0;
where  = w; that:
" =
L
H
" (F15)
In order to interpret this expression when the take-up of the hiring credit is smaller than
one, let us denote by Lt = Lt + Lt total employment where Lt stands for employment of rms
that do not benet from the hiring credit and Lt for employment of rms that benet from the
hiring credit. Assuming that the wage is identical in all rms, the average cost per employee
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becomes  t = wt   t HtLt where Ht denotes the hires of rms with positive take-up. It is easily
checked that we get, in the neighborhood of steady state and  = 0 :
" =  dLd
d
d 
 
L =
L
H
"
where H stands for the number of hires of rms with positive take-up. Let us denote  the
corresponding ratio of subsidized hires over employment H=L.
We can now write the employment elasticity with respect to a change in labor cost due to
a temporary or permanent hiring credit when wages are exogenous and only a small fraction of
rms are targeted (micro elasticity):
"(micro; temp; exo) =
1


1 + cVm()w [1  (1  q)]

"(micro; perm; exo) =
1


1 + cVm()w [1  (1  q)]

Let us now determine the cost per job created by a temporary subsidy on all wages in period
t and by the hiring subsidy t in the neighborhood of steady state and t = 0: The cost per job
created by the subsidy which decreases all wages by an amount  dw is:
c =  Ldw
dL
=  w
"
(F16)
The cost per job created by the hiring credit is equal to
c =
Hd
dL
=
H
L
w
dL
d
w
L
(F17)
Since dLd =   dLdw (see equation (F13)) and " = HL " (see equation (3)), the cost per job created
by the hiring credit is
c =   w
"
F.1.2 Macro elasticity of employment with exogenous wage
This appendix computes the macro elasticity of employment with respect to the change in
the contemporaneous labor cost in the neighborhood of steady state of the search and match-
ing model presented in section 7.2.1. We rst compute the micro elasticity with respect to
a temporary change in the wage wt. The equilibrium values of employment and of the labor
market tightness in period t are given by equations (7) and (8), which can be written, in the
neighborhood of steady state, denoting without time subscript the steady state values of the
unemployment rate u, of the labor market tightness  and of the job separation rate q:
AtRL(Lt) = wt +
cV
m t
  (1  q) cV
m()
(F18)
1  Lt = u+ q(1  u)  m1 t u (F19)
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where Lt = 1   ut: Di¤erentiation of these equations yields the macro elasticity of contempo-
raneous employment with respect to labor cost when there is a temporary change in the wage
wt. Then, applying relation (3) which states that " = "=, where56  = H=L we get the macro
elasticity of contemporaneous employment with respect to labor cost when there is a tempo-
rary change in labor cost induced by a temporary hiring credit in a context where the wage is
exogenous:
"(macro, temp, exo) =
1

h
1 + cVm()w

[1  (1  q)]  q(1 )
i (F20)
where  = LRLL(L)=RL(L):
Similarly, the macro elasticity of steady state employment with respect to labor costs when
the change in labor cost is induced by a permanent hiring credit in a context where the wage is
exogenous, is:
"(macro, perm,exo) =
1

h
1 + cVw
[1 (1 q)]
m()

1  (1 )u
i (F21)
F.2 Elasticity of employment with wage posting
This appendix presents the impact of the hiring credit in a directed search and matching model
with wage posting in the spirit of Moen (1997) described in the main text. We characterize the
steady state equilibrium when directed search and wage posting is integrated in the model of
appendix F.1 in a rst step. Then, we analyze the impact of temporary and permanent hiring
credits.
F.2.1 Stationary equilibrium without hiring credit
The hypothesis of directed search by workers and perfect mobility implies that the expected
utility of an unemployed person is the same in all labor pools, so it will simply be denoted
by Wu;t. Assuming further that the job destruction rate qt is identical in each labor pool, the
expected utility Wei;t of a person employed in labor pool i in period t satises:
Wei;t = wi;t +  [(1  qt)Wei;t+1 + qtWu;t+1] (F22)
If the instantaneous gain b of an unemployed person is the same everywhere, the expected
utility Wu;t of a person in search of work satises:
Wu;t = b+  [i;t+1m(i;t+1)Wei;t+1 + (1  i;t+1m(i;t+1))Wu;t+1] 8i; t (F23)
Di¤erentiating the previous equation (holdingWu;t constant) denes a relation betweenWei;t
and i;t:
@i;t
@Wei;t
=
 i;t
(1  ) (Wei;t  Wu;t) (F24)
56Since all rms are identical in the model, H=L can be interpreted indi¤erently as the average hiring
rate of all rms or of the rms that benet from the hiring credit. In the simulations of the impact of the
various hiring credits, it is assumed that the take-up rate is constant and that H=L is the average hiring
rate of all rms that benet from the hiring credit.
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The employers post wages, which are constant and non renegotiable. We focus on the
stationary equilibrium where:
Wei =
wi + qWu
1  (1  q)
From the denitions of Wei and Wu we have
Wei  Wu = wi   (1  )Wu
1  (1  q) (F25)
and therefore:
@i
@wi
=
 i
(1  ) (wi   (1  )Wu)
For a given number of unemployed persons in pool i; the optimal strategy for the entrepre-
neurs present in this pool consists of o¤ering, at each date t; a non renegotiable constant wage
wi;t. The problem of the rm, which takes Wu as given, can be written:
max
fVi;t;wi;tgt=1;:::;1
1X
t=1
t
"
AR(Li;t) 
tY
=1
(1  q 1)tLi;0wi;0
 
t 1X
=0
wi;t m(i;t  )Vi;t 
Y
x=0
(1  qt x)  cV Vi;t
#
s.t. Li;t =
tY
=0
(1 q )Li;0+
t 1X
=0
m(i;t  )Vi;t 
Y
x=0
(1 qt x) and @i;t
@wi;t
=
 i;t
(1  ) (wi;t   (1  )Wu;t)
The rst order conditions with respect to Vi;t and wi;t, around the steady state (i and q
constant across periods), are respectively
 cV +m(i)
1X
=0
 (1  q) [ARL(Li;t+ )  wi;t] = 0 (F26)
m0(i)
@i
@wi;t
1X
=0
 (1  q) [ARL(Lt+ )  wi;t] m(i)
1X
=0
 (1  q) = 0 (F27)
From these two equations we obtain the steady state value of the wage which is identical in
all labor pools, in the symmetric equilibrium:
w = ARL(L) + (1  )(1  )Wu
From (F23), (F24), (F25), (F26) and (F27) we get
Wu(1  ) = b+  
(1  )cV
so that the wage equation is
w =  [ARL(L)  b+ cV ] + b
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Using the labor demand equation
ARL(L) = w +
cV [1  (1  q)]
m()
we can determine the wage:
w = b+

1  cV

[1  (1  q)]
m()
+ 

and the employment level
ARL(L) = b+
1
1  
cV [1  (1  q)]
m()
+ cV

1  
F.2.2 Underemployment in the wage posting model
Let us now verify that there is underemployment in the economy with some degree of monop-
olistic competition compared to the constrained e¢ cient allocation. As the optimal allocation
of products is symmetric, this is equivalent to maximizing the discounted production of each
product net of the cost of job vacancies. We solve:

(ut 1) = max
Vt
F (1  ut) + but   cV Vt + 
(ut)
s.t. ut = ut 1 + q(1  ut 1)  Vt
ut 1
m(
Vt
ut 1
)ut 1
The solution satises:
FL(1  u) = b+ 1
1  
cV [1  (1  q)]
m()
+ cV

1  
The solution of the wage posting model is
E   1
E
FL(1  u) = b+ 1
1  
cV [1  (1  q)]
m()
+ cV

1  
where we use the fact that: RL = E 1E FL(L)F (L)
 1
E = E 1E FL(L)P and P = 1 in the symmetric
equilibrium of the wage posting model. As E > 1; the allocation of the wage posting model
yields underemployment. Hiring credits can thus decrease the unemployment rate to narrow the
gap to the constrained e¢ cient allocation.
F.2.3 Temporary hiring credit
Now, let us assume that there is a non-anticipated temporary hiring subsidy in period t in the
neighborhood of steady state. Employers post wages, which are constant and non renegotiable
as assumed above, and a bonus zi;t for the current period. This bonus enables the employer and
the employee to share the supplementary surplus provided by the hiring credit. In this context,
the current labor earnings in period t, denoted by !i;t; are the sum of the stationary wage w
and of the bonus zi;t: We still have
@i;t
@Wei;t
=
 i;t
(1  ) (Wei;t  Wu;t) :
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The economy is in the neighborhood of steady state at date t: Thus, qt, Wu;t+1, Wei;t+1 and
i;t+1 are at their steady state value. Accordingly, we have from equations (F22) and (F23):
Wei;t  Wu;t = !i;t   b+ (1  m()  q) (We  Wu) (F28)
and, therefore,
@i;t
@zi;t
=
@i;t
@Wei;t
@Wei;t
@zi;t
=
 i;t
(1  ) (Wei;t  Wu;t) :
The problem of the rm is to choose the bonus and the number of job vacancies that maximize
its prots:
(Z;L) = max
(Vi;t;zi;t)
AR(Li;t)  wLi;t + (t   zi;t)m(i;t)Vi;t   cV Vi;t + (Z;Li;t);
where Z = (A;w; q); subject to the law of motion of employment:
Li;t = (1  q)L+m(i;t)Vi;t and @i;t
@zi;t
=
 i;t
(1  ) (Wei;t  Wu;t) : (F29)
The rst order conditions with respect to Vi;t and zi;t can be written
ARL(Li;t)  !i;t + t + L(Z;Li;t) = cV
m(i;t)
(F30)

(1  ) [ARL(Lt)  !i;t + t + L(Z;Li;t)] =Wei;t  Wu;t: (F31)
From equations (F30) and (F31) we get
Wei;t  Wu;t = 
(1  )
cV
m(i;t)
: (F32)
This equation shows that the hiring subsidy t has no direct impact on the utility, and therefore
on the remuneration obtained by the employee. The subsidy has an impact only through con-
gestion e¤ects associated with the labor market tightness that changes the average recruitment
costs cV =m(i;t) and the reservation utility Wu;t. Looking at equation (F30) we see that rms
increase the number of job vacancies up to the point where the marginal discounted net revenue
of employment equals the average recruitment costs cV =m(i;t): Hence, choosing the number of
vacancies when the marginal revenue of labor is decreasing allows the rm to avoid sharing the
hiring subsidy with the incumbent workers. More generally, this mechanism, which has been
highlighted by Stole and Zwiebel (1996), Brugemann et al. (2016), and examined further in a
search and matching model by Cahuc et al. (2008), arises when there are decreasing marginal
returns to labor and when rms can commit on employment either at the same time as they set
the wage o¤er or before they bargain the wage.
Using equations (F28), (F30) and (F31), together with the steady state value of (We Wu),
we obtain:
!i;t = b+ cV

(1  )

1
m(i;t)
   1  m()  q
m()

:
Substituting in equation (F31) and using (F30), we get in symmetric equilibrium in period t
!t = b+  [AtRL(Lt) + t + cV   b] : (F33)
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So that (7) and (8) can be written for period t :
AtRL(Lt) = b  t + cV
(1  )

1
m(t)
  (1  q)
m()

+

1  cV (F34)
1  Lt = ut 1 + q(1  ut 1) m(t)ut 1: (F35)
Di¤erentiation of these equations provides the macro elasticity of contemporaneous employ-
ment with respect to labor costs when there is a temporary change in labor costs induced by a
temporary hiring credit in a context where the wage is endogenous:
"(macro,temp,endo) =
1

h
1 + cVm()w

[1  (1  q)]  
q(1 )2
i : (F36)
where  = H=L and  = LRLL(L)=RL(L) < 0:
F.2.4 Permanent hiring credit
Let us analyze the consequence of a permanent hiring credit on steady state employment. As-
suming that the hiring subsidy  is permanent, we get in steady state, from the rst-order
conditions of the maximization problem of the rm:
ARL(L)  w
1  (1  q) +  =
cV
m()
(F37)

(1  ) [ARL(L)  w + [1  (1  q)]] =We  Wu: (F38)
In this equation, the term w   [1  (1  q)] represents the instantaneous labor cost per
employee, equal to the wage minus the ow of benets of the hiring credit spread out on the
expected duration of the job. Proceeding as in the previous subsection, it is easily shown that
these two equations imply
w = b+ (ARL(L) +  [1  (1  q)] + cV   b): (F39)
This wage equation is similar to equation (F33) except that  is now multiplied by the factor
[1  (1  q)] : It is worth stressing, however, that a permanent hiring credit has a di¤erent
e¤ect on wages than a temporary hiring credit because the steady state labor market tightness
 which appears in the wage equation (F39) reacts to a permanent hiring credit, but not to a
temporary hiring credit. This implies that a permanent hiring credit has a stronger e¤ect on
wages than a temporary hiring credit. This e¤ect comes through the impact of the labor market
tightness on the expected value of unemployed workers, which can be written, using equations
(F23) and (F32):
Wu;t =
b
1   +

1  cV
1X
=1
t+ (F40)
assuming that the transversality condition limt!1 tWu;t = 0 is fullled. This expression for
Wu;t shows that a temporary increase in labor market tightness has a lower impact on Wu;t, and
therefore on wages, than a permanent increase.
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Using the same method as in the previous subsection, we get, from the di¤erentiation of
equations (F37), (F38) and (F39), the macro elasticity of employment with respect to labor cost
when the change in labor cost stems from a permanent hiring credit in a context where the wage
is endogenous:
"(macro,perm,endo) =
1

h
1 + cV [1 (1 q)]wm()
i
  cV [1 (1 q)]wm() (1 )2u  
q(1 u)cV
w(1 )2u2m()
F.3 Simulations of the cost per job created
The costs per job created of di¤erent hiring credits can be expressed as functions of ; cV ; ; ; q,
of the equilibrium values of the duration of vacant jobs, 1=m(); and of u at baseline (i.e. without
hiring credits).
We showed above that (E;) is the only parameter that is a function of the market power
of rms measured by the price mark-up E=(E 1). When simulating the cost per job created of
hiring credits under di¤erent market powers, we vary E and hold constant the labor elasticity
of the production function : This leads to variations in ; while all other parameters are hold
constant. We assume that the data observed in France from 2006-2009 were generated by the
wage posting model with a price mark-up E=(E   1) = 1:3 ( E = 4:3, see Bouis, 2008). Given
our estimate of ; we can then back out the implied elasticity of the production function :
We consider two other environments: one with a very high mark-up equal to 1.6 (E =
2:7) and one with perfect competition. When we compute the cost per job created in these
counterfactual environments, we update the before-credit equilibrium values of m() and u;
using the wage-posting equilibrium conditions (F37) and (F39). To do so, we need to further
pin down the matching e¢ ciency m; the productivity parameter and the instantaneous gain b
of an unemployed person. m is identied using the Beveridge curve from 2006-2009 and our
estimate of . We scale the economy by setting the wage in this reference environment equal to
1. Then, using the labor demand equation (F37), we derive a consistent productivity parameter
A = :927: Using the model solution - equation (F39), we obtain the replacement ratio b = :945:
This order of magnitude is consistent with the ratio computed by Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008) including the utility derived from extra leisure when unemployed.
Table A8 summarizes the parameters values and the resulting baseline equilibrium values
under di¤erent degrees of market power (across columns). The rst column corresponds to
the reference environment where the market power is medium (price mark-up equal to 1.3).
The second column corresponds to a high market power and the last column to the perfect
competition environment. The rst row reports the price elasticity of demand and the second row
the implied price mark-up. The third row reports the resulting elasticity of the marginal revenue.
Then, the last rows show that under perfect competition (last column), the unemployment rate
goes down to 4%; while the average vacancy duration is more than halved compared to the
intermediate-competition case (from 0:2 to 0:07 years). This corresponds to the constrained
e¢ cient allocation. When the market power is high, unemployment surges to over 20% and the
vacancy duration more than triples.
The parameter and equilibrium values in table A8 are plugged in the di¤erent formulas of
employment elasticities, detailed in appendix F.1 and F.2, to obtain the cost per job created in
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table 9.
Table A8: Parameters and baseline equilibrium under di¤erent degrees of market power
Market power Medium High Zero
Price elasticity of demand: E 4:3 2:7 1
Mark-up: E=(E   1) 1:3 1:6 1
Elasticity of marginal revenue:   :964  :971  :953
Unemployment rate: u 8:3% 21:6% 4:1%
Labor market tightness:  1:1 :10 6:15
Average vacancy duration (year): 1=m() :2 :70 :07
Source: Pole emploi and Insee. Authors computation.
F.4 Elasticity of employment in the business cycle and counter-
cyclical hiring credits
In this appendix, we explicitly include macro shocks in the search and matching model. We rst
derive the behavior of rms when wages are exogenous. Second, we solve for the equilibrium
employment level and wages when rms post wages. Third, we simulate the micro- and macro-
e¤ects of countercyclical policies and the resulting cost-per-job-created.
F.4.1 Two state model with exogenous wages
We assume 2 states of nature, corresponding to 2 levels of the productivity parameter AG > AB:
The instantaneous transition probability from state AG to state AB is denoted eG, while the
instantaneous transition probability from state AB to state AG is denoted eB. The ratio 1=eG
(or 1=eB) represents the average length of time the economy remains in state AG (or AB): it
is a measure of the persistence of state AG (or AB). We assume that the 2 states also di¤er in
their job separation rate: qG < qB
We rst derive the solution of the model with exogenous wages, denoted by wB and wG:We
assume that there is no layo¤ beyond the level qjL where qj stands for the exogenous job
separation rate in state j = A;B: We start by presenting the model without the hiring credits.
The value function of the rm in each state satises:
B(Lt 1) = max
(Vt)
ABR(Lt)  wBLt   cV Vt + 

eB
G(Lt) + (1  eB)B(Lt)

;
G(Lt 1) = max
(Vt)
AGR(Lt)  wGLt   cV Vt + 

eG
B(Lt) + (1  eG)G(Lt)

;
subject to the law of motion of employment:
Lt = (1  qj)Lt 1 +m(t)Vt ; j = B;G: (F41)
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The rst order conditions are:
ABRL(Lt)  wB + 

eB
G
L (Lt) + (1  eB)BL (Lt)

=
cV
m(t)
;
AGRL(Lt)  wH + 

eG
B
L (Lt) + (1  eG)GL (Lt)

=
cV
m(t)
:
The envelope conditions are:
BL (Lt 1) = (1  qB)

ABRL(Lt)  wB + 

eB
G
L (Lt) + (1  eB)BL (Lt)

;
GL (Lt 1) = (1  qG)

AGRL(Lt)  wG + 

eG
B
L (Lt) + (1  eG)GL (Lt)

:
We solve for the employment level without taking into account the transition path from one
state to the other. This is a relevant approximation, since we have linear adjustment cost at the
level of the rm, and since labor ows are large empirically (see Jolivet et al. (2006)). Then
there are only 2 levels of employment, LG and LB; and 2 levels of labor market tightness, G
and B: Using the rst-order conditions, the envelope conditions yield:
BL (LB) = (1  qB)
cV
m(B)
;
GL (LG) = (1  qG)
cV
m(G)
;
so that the rst-order conditions yield:
ABRL(LB) = wB   eB(1  qG) cV
m(G)
+
cV
m(B)
[1  (1  eB)(1  qB)] ;
AGRL(LG) = wH   eG(1  qB) cV
m(B)
+
cV
m(G)
[1  (1  eG)(1  qG)] :
The law of motion of employment further implies that
qjLj = jm(j)(1  Lj); j = B;G: (F42)
We now introduce hiring credits in the 2-state model. There are di¤erent hiring credits in
each state: G and B: The hiring subsidy in state j = B;G is equivalent to an increase in the
marginal revenue of labor in state j equal to sj such that the discounted expected value of the
ow of subsidy sj on the whole expected job duration is equivalent to a one shot subsidy j .
To dene the equivalent variations sj , we also assume that the ow of subsidy is paid to the
jobs only in the current state. Accordingly, we have sj = j [1  (1  qj)(1  ej)] : The labor
demand equations for each state then become:
ABRL(LB) = wB   sB   eB(1  qG) cV
m(G)
+
cV
m(B)
[1  (1  eB)(1  qB)] ; (F43)
AGRL(LG) = wG   sG   eG(1  qB) cV
m(B)
+
cV
m(G)
[1  (1  eG)(1  qG)] : (F44)
Equations (F42), (F43) and (F44) enable us to compute numerical simulations of employment
elasticities along the business cycle and of cost per job created by di¤erent hiring credits, when
wages are exogenous. We present these simulations in more details below, after we endogenize
wages.
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F.4.2 Two state model with wage posting
As above, we assume two states of nature, B and G; with corresponding productivity levels
and separation rates. We endogenize wages, as in the 1-state model, by assuming that wages
are posted. Each rm chooses the number of vacancies and the labor contract that maximizes
its value. The contract stipulates a wage that provides a level of expected utility W je to the
employee in each state j = B;G. The expected utility in state j of an employee who faces a
transition probability ej to the other macro state j0;writes:
W je = wj + 
h
(1  qj)
h
(1  ej)W je + ejW j
0
e
i
+ qj
h
(1  ej)W ju + ejW j
0
u
ii
; (F45)
where the index of rm i is omitted for the sake of simplicity. The hypothesis of directed search
by workers and perfect mobility imply that the expected utility of an unemployed person is
the same in all labor pools. If the instantaneous gain b of an unemployed person is the same
everywhere and in each state j = B;G, the expected utility W ju of a person looking for work in
state j satises:
W ju = b+
h
(1  ej)

jm(j)W
j
e + (1  jm(j))W ju

+ ej
h
j0m(j0)W
j0
e + (1  j0m(j0))W j
0
u
ii
:
(F46)
As in the one-state model, di¤erentiating the previous equation, holdingW ju constant, denes
a relation between W je and j :
@j
@W je
=
 j
(1  )

W je  W ju
 : (F47)
The problem of the rm can then be decomposed in 2 steps. First, the optimal choice of
the number of vacancies implies that the labor demand derived just above in the model with
exogenous wage is still valid - equations (F43) and (F44). Second, the rm chooses the wage
stipulated in its labor contracts, or equivalently the rm chooses the expected utility promised
to the employee. To solve this second step, let us denote by J j(Lj) the marginal value of a job
already matched in the rm, which is equal, by denition, to jL(Lj)=(1  qj), or:
J j(Lj) =
jL(Lj)
(1  qj) = AjRL(Lj)  wj   sj + 
h
(1  ei)jL(Lj) + ejj
0
L (Lj0)
i
(F48)
where sj is the ow-equivalent hiring credit in state j; and the last equality is obtained thanks
to the envelope theorem. The rm chooses to post labor contracts which provide a value W je to
the marginal employee in order to maximize
m(j)J
j(Lj);
or such that
@j
@W je
m0(j)J j(Lj) +m(j)
@J j(Lj)
@W je
= 0:
The denition of the surplus of the marginal job, equal to Sj(Lj) = J j(Lj) +W
j
e  W ju ;
which is independent of W je ; implies that
@Jj(Lj)
@W je
=  1: Accordingly, using equation (F47), we
get the Hosios condition:
J j(Lj) = (1  )
 
W je  W ju

:
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Consequently, using the envelope condition, we obtain the expressions of the joint surplus and
of the surplus of the employee:
Sj =
J j(Lj)
(1  ) =
1
(1  )
cV
m(j)
; (F49)
W je  W ju =

1  J
j(Lj) =

1  
cV
m(j)
:
Taking the sum of the Bellman equations dening the value of a marginal job to the rm and
the value of employment to the worker expressions (F48) and (F45) and substracting the
Bellman equation to the value of unemployment expression (F46) , we get:
Sj = AjRL(Lj) + sj   b+ 
h
ej(1  qj0)Sj0 + (1  ej)(1  qj)Sj
i
  (1  ej)jm(j)
 
W je  W ju
  ej j0m(j0) + qj   qj0 W j0e  W j0u  :
Then, using the expression (F49), we get
ABRL(LB) = b  sB + 1
(1  )
cV
m(B)
[1   (1  eB) (1  qB)]  (1  qG)eB 1
(1  )
cV
m(G)
(F50)
+ (1  eB)Bm(B) 
(1  )
cV
m(B)
+ eB [Gm(G) + qB   qG] 
(1  )
cV
m(G)
;
AGRL(LG) = b  sG + 1
(1  )
cV
m(G)
[1   (1  eG) (1  qG)]  (1  qB)eG 1
(1  )
cV
m(B)
(F51)
+ (1  eG)Gm(G) 
(1  )
cV
m(G)
+ eG [Bm(B) + qG   qB] 
(1  )
cV
m(B)
:
Equations (F50) and (F51) enable us to compute numerical simulations of employment
elasticities along the business cycle and of the cost per job created by di¤erent hiring credits,
when wages are endogenous.
F.4.3 Simulations of the two state model
As the analytical expressions of the employment elasticities are more complicated in the 2-
state model than in the 1-state model, we simulate the whole model solution numerically, and
compute the elasticities and cost per job created by di¤erent hiring credits. This section explains
the simulations of the model solution.
First, we consider a reference environment where the unemployment rate is 8:3%, the vacancy
duration is 0:2 year, and the annual job separation rate is 0:5. This is the same reference
environment as in the 1-state model presented in Table 9. We then follow the same calibration
strategy as in section F.3. The only di¤erence is that the model is calibrated on a quarterly
basis (instead of an annual basis). Consequently, we use a quarterly discount factor  = :988:
The main outcomes and parameters of the reference environment are summarized in the rst
column of Table A9.
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Table A9: Calibration of the 2-state model
Reference Bad state Good state
Unemployment rate u 8:3% 11% 7%
Quarterly separation rate q :158 :187 :146
Vacancy duration in quarters 1=m () 1:25 1:41 1:16
Quarterly job nding rate m () 1:76 1:52 1:93
Labor market tightness  1:41 1:07 1:67
Productivity A :927 :889 :950
Wages w 1 :987 1:01
Source: Pole emploi and Insee. Authorscomputation.
From this reference environment, we obtain two states: bad and good. We assume that uB =
0:11 and uG = 0:07. Following the literature on the decomposition of unemployment volatility
(Hairault et al, 2015), we attribute 50% of this change from the reference unemployment to
changes in separation rates and 50% to changes in job nding rates. The corresponding job
separation rates and labor market tightness are reported in the second and third columns of
Table A9.
We consider cycles between these 2 states. We assume that the good and bad states are
generated by shocks on both the separation rate and the productivity level. All the other
parameters are constant over the cycle: ; cV ; ;m0; b: The probabilities of entering into and
leaving a recession are set such that recessions last 25 months and booms 31 months (average
duration in France between peak and through of the GDP growth over the period 1958-2016).
This yields: eB = :12 and eG = :097 on a quarterly basis. Then, we solve for the productivity
using the system of equations (F50) and (F51). Recessions are triggered by a 6% shock on
productivity. Using the labor demand equations (F43) and (F44), we back out the wage levels
in each state. As expected, they are procyclical and decrease by around 3% during recessions.
From the baseline cycle between these two states, we simulate temporary, time-invariant
and countercyclical hiring credits, which can either be targeted to a small subset of rms (labor
market tightness is then una¤ected), or to all rms. When wages are exogenous, we simulate the
labor demand equations (F43) and (F44), together with the Beveridge curve. When the wages
are endogenous, we simulate equations (F50) and (F51), again with the Beveridge curve.
The temporary hiring credit is a one-year unanticipated credit implemented from the start
of the recession. The computation of its cost per job created relies on the employment elasticity
with respect to sB only. Let us denote by " this elasticity. The cost per job created is then w=";
where  is the ratio of hires beneting from the credit to employment. We take  = :26; as in
the computation of the 1-state model.
The time-invariant hiring credit is constant over the cycle, such that sG = sB = 0:01: We
then simulate the changes in employment dLG, and dLB: The change in average employment
is dL = eGeB+eGdL
B+dLG eBeB+eG . Consequently, we compute the employment elasticity
dLw
L:ds
: As
every employee benets from the permanent hiring credit when she is hired, the cost per job
created is just equal to the wage w divided by the employment elasticity.
The countercyclical hiring credit is available in recessions only: sB = 0:01 and sG = 0: We
84
then simulate the employment elasticity "(counter), following the steps above. As recessions
last on average 2 years, we assume that the share (counter) = :52 of employees benet from
the hiring credit  extrapolating from the treated share estimated in the one-year temporary
hiring credit zéro charges ( (counter) = 2:). The cost per job created reported in Table 10, is
then (counter)w="(counter):
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G Supplementary Tables
Table A10: Number of eligible/ ineligible rms and employees in the sample in 2008
Number of rms
Number of employees
(in 2008)
Number of employees (rm level) below 10 above 10 below 10 above 10
all 832; 910 146; 811 3; 892; 725 11; 381; 920
+ excluding temp. help agencies,
associations & agriculture
654; 047 123; 177 2; 882; 882 9; 364; 554
+ trimming extreme values 647; 230 120; 075 2; 793; 922 9; 285; 739
+ keeping 6-10 and 10-14 employees only 71; 391 31; 163 649; 825 433; 702
+ excluding missing control variables 70; 998 30; 912 646; 717 430; 109
Source : DADS (Insee). Note: The number of employees is the average number of employees per rm in
2008 (average of monthly full-time equivalent employees between 1 January and 30 November 2008).
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Table A11: Di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates of the impact of the hiring credit on various
labor market outcomes in 2009 for surviving rms
Cohorts 2006-2009 2006-2009 2008-2009
Covariates No Yes Yes
Employment growth :009
(:002)
:008
(:002)
:009
(:002)
Hours growth :010
(:002)
:009
(:002)
:009
(:002)
Hiring rate :014
(:005)
:012
(:004)
:020
(:005)
Separation rate :005
(:005)
:004
(:004)
:011
(:005)
Nb. Observations 400; 293 400; 293 204; 311
Source : DADS (Insee). Note : this Table presents our di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates for di¤erent
outcomes (rows) and di¤erent specications (columns) for surviving rms. The treatment group
comprises rms of size between 6 (included) and 10 (excluded) full-time equivalent employees in the
previous year (average from 1 December to 30 November). The control group comprises rms of size
between 10 (included) and 14 (excluded) full time equivalent employees in the previous year (average
from 1 December to 30 November). We consider as outcomes the growth rate of employment between
30 November of year t and year t-1; the growth rate of the number of hours worked between November
of year t and November of year t-1; the number of hires from 1 December of year t-1 to 30 november of
year t divided by employment on 30 November of year t-1; the number of separations from 1 December
of year t-1 to 30 November of year t divided by employment on 30 November of year t-1; and the
number of excess reallocation from 1 December of year t-1 to 30 November of year t divided by
employment on 30 November of year t-1. As covariates, we include year, sector and regions dummies, as
well as their interactions; we also include dummies for rm age, rms with sales below 2 millions euros
in the previous year, the share of low-wage and part-time workers in the previous year and the shares of
female or male workers with di¤erent occupations (managers, white-collar or blue-collar workers).
Robust standard deviations in parentheses. * signicant at 10 percent, ** signicant at 5 percent, ***
signicant at 1 percent.
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Table A12: Di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates of the impact of the hiring credit on various
labor market outcomes in 2009 with weighted observations
Cohorts 2006-2009 2006-2009 2008-2009
Covariates No Yes Yes
Employment growth :009
(:002)
:008
(:002)
:008
(:002)
Hours growth :010
(:002)
:008
(:002)
:008
(:002)
Hiring rate :014
(:005)
:012
(:004)
:019
(:005)
Separation rate :005
(:005)
:004
(:004)
:010
(:005)
Survival rate :000
(:001)
:000
(:001)
 :001
(:001)
Nb. Observations 406; 468 406; 468 207; 379
Source : DADS (Insee). Note : this Table presents our di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates for di¤erent
outcomes (rows) and di¤erent specications (columns) when rms are weighted according to their size
as measured by the number of full time equivalent employees in the previous year. The treatment group
comprises rms of size between 6 (included) and 10 (excluded) full time equivalent employees in the
previous year (average from 1 December to 30 November). The control group comprises rms of size
between 10 (included) and 14 (excluded) full time equivalent employees in the previous year (average
from 1 December to 30 November). We consider as outcomes the growth rate of employment between
30 November of year t-1 and year t; the growth rate of the number of hours worked between November
of year t-1 and November of year t; the number of hires from 1 December of year t-1 to 30 November of
year t divided by employment on 30 November of year t-1; the number of separations from 1 December
of year t-1 to 30 November of year t divided by employment on 30 November of year t-1; As covariates,
we include year, sector and regions dummies, as well as their interactions; we also include dummies for
rm age, rms with sales below 2 million euros in the previous year, the share of low-wage and
part-time workers in the previous year and the shares of female or male workers with di¤erent
occupations (managers, white-collar or blue-collar workers). Robust standard deviations in parentheses.
* signicant at 10 percent, ** signicant at 5 percent, *** signicant at 1 percent.
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Table A13: Di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates of the impact of the hiring credit on various
labor market outcomes in 2009 by sector
Industries Services Others
Cohorts 2006-2009 2006-2009
Covariates Yes Yes
Employment growth :008
(:002)
:009
(:003)
Hours growth :009
(:002)
:009
(:003)
Hiring rate :018
(:007)
:010
(:004)
Separation rate :010
(:006)
:001
(:004)
Nb. Observations 261; 787 144; 681
Source : DADS (Insee). Note : this Table presents our di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates for di¤erent
outcomes (rows) for di¤erent sector (columns). The treatment group comprises rms of size between 6
(included) and 10 (excluded) full-time equivalent employees in the previous year (average from 1
December to 30 November). The control group comprises rms of size between 10 (included) and 14
(excluded) full time equivalent employees in the previous year (average from 1 December to 30
November). We consider as outcomes the growth rate of employment between 30 November of year t
and year t-1; the growth rate of the number of hours worked between November of year t and November
of year t-1; the number of hires from 1 December of year t-1 to 30 november of year t divided by
employment on 30 November of year t-1; the number of separations from 1 December of year t-1 to 30
November of year t divided by employment on 30 November of year t-1. As covariates, we include year,
sector and regions dummies, as well as their interactions; we also include dummies for rm age, rms
with sales below 2 millions euros in the previous year, the share of low-wage and part-time workers in
the previous year and the shares of female or male workers with di¤erent occupations (managers,
white-collar or blue-collar workers). Robust standard deviations in parentheses. * signicant at 10
percent, ** signicant at 5 percent, *** signicant at 1 percent.
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Table A14: Di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates of the impact of the hiring credit on em-
ployment and hours worked in 2009 based on employment pool x sector units
Cohorts 2006-2009 2006-2009 2008-2009
Covariates No Yes Yes
Employment growth :008
(:002)
 :007
(:002)
 :008
(:002)

Hours growth :008
(:002)
 :008
(:002)
 :008
(:002)

Nb. Observations 13; 537 13; 537 6; 778
Source : DADS (Insee). Note : this table presents our di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates for di¤erent
outcomes (rows) and di¤erent specications (columns) based on averaged labor market outcomes for 5
di¤erent sectors in 348 employments pools. Within each employment pool x sector unit the treatment
group comprises rms of size between 6 (included) and 10 (excluded) full time equivalent employees in
the previous year (average from 1 January to 30 November). For each year, we only consider units for
which we have observations in our treatment or our control groups. The control group comprises rms
of size between 10 (included) and 14 (excluded) full-time equivalent employees in the previous year
(average from 1 January to 30 November). We consider as outcomes the growth rate of employment
between 30 November of year t-1 and year t; the growth rate of the number of hours worked between
November of year t-1 and November of year t. As covariates, we include year dummies, sector dummies,
region dummies and their interactions. We also include dummies for distribution of rmsage, the share
of rms with sales below 2 million euros in the previous year, the share of low-wage and part-time
workers in the previous year and the shares of female or male workers with di¤erent occupations
(managers, white-collar or blue-collar workers). Weights are used: for each employment pool x sector
unit the weight equals total employment among rms with less than 14 full-time equivalent employees
in the previous year. Robust standard deviations in parentheses. * signicant at 10 percent, **
signicant at 5 percent, *** signicant at 1 percent.
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